PUP College of Law

SOURCE: puplawstudent.blogspot.com

UPDATE: Thirteen (13) PUP bar examinees, twelve (12) of whom are first takers, passed the recent 2010 bar examination. The College got a commendable 28.26% passing rate which is much higher than the National percentage of only 20.26%.

Congratulations to the new PUP lawyers!!! Long live PUP Law!!!

The College of Law
The PUP College of Law was established in 2001. Its first dean was former Supreme Court Justice Dante Tinga. Young as the College may seem, it has nevertheless fared very well in bar examinations.

Its faculty is composed of professors who are also teaching in prestigious law schools.

Bar passers of PUP College of Law

2010 Bar examination (13/46)



PUP passing rate - 28.26%
National percentage of passers - 20.26%

ABONG, Mark Julio U .
CERO, De Mille V .
DALIVA, JR., Anacleto I .
DELA CRUZ, JR., Cresencio D.
FLORES, Reynaldo L .
MANGROBANG, III, Jonas Cesar C .
MATEO, Arnel D .
NUDO, John Joenelle V.
RAMOS, Ronald Allan D .
RODRIGUEZ, Josefina S .
TOLENTINO, Aaron S .
TORREJA, Richard P .
VALENCIA, Dianeth L .


2009 Bar examination (16/40)


PUP Percentage of passing - 40%
National percentage of passers - 24.58%

Maricris Alura
Maricel Cano
Alvin Guiterrez
Harold Kim Hernando
Ericson Lameyra
Edward Magat
Rosalie Mazo
Ryan Medrano
Ronald Crisanto Mercado
Dennis Palad
Epicurus Charlo Salcedo
Melissa San Miguel
Arlyn Santos- Montebon
Florences Sta. Ana



2008 Bar examination


NO DATA
National percentage of passers - 20.58%


2007 Bar Examination (9)


PUP Percentage of passing - 32%
National percentage of passers - 22.91%


Aquino , Aristotle R.
Aurellana, Rinchel E.
Cristobal Laurrie Layne P.
Deticio, Aileen Grace U.
Figueroa, Eddalaine
Lampa, Rex D.
Omadto, Arnold Ninoy Jr. P.
Suril, Ethel Rea G.
Tandog, Jonathan G.



2006 Bar examinations (8)

PUP Percentage of passing - 33.33%
National percentage of passers - 30.60%

Eric Opriasa
Christian Bautista
Ricky Gonzaga
Nova Delas Armas
Alvin Claridades
Anna Victoria Carlos
Maybelle Ramos
Rossano Pietro Veloso.


FEES:

Tuition (per unit) PhP 500.00

Miscellaneous
Application/Entrance Exam Fee 300.00
Registration Fee 100.00
Library Fee 100.00
Medical and Dental 50.00
ID (upon admission) 200.00
IT Utilization 100.00
Energy Fee (per month) 100.00
Certification (Letter Form) 50.00
Graduation Fee 200.00
Diploma Fee 100.00
Transcript of Records (per page) 100.00
Fine for Late Payment 100.00
Re-Admission Fee 200.00
Retrieval Fee 50.00
Validation Fee 50.00
Admission Fee for Transfer Students (from private) 500.00
Admission Fee for Transfer Students (from SUC) 300.00

Tags: Pup College Of Law Bar Passer 2011

SC: Congress can include sugarlands in CARP

SC: Congress can include sugarlands in CARP - Nation - GMANews.TV - Official Website of GMA News and Public Affairs - Latest Philippine News

Anti-Camcording Law OK welcomed

Anti-Camcording Law OK welcomed - INQUIRER.net, Philippine News for Filipinos

On firing Arroyo appointees

Go slow in firing Arroyo appointees, Aquino told - INQUIRER.net, Philippine News for Filipinos

Is Noynoy the best choice to lead the Philippines?

Yes. Despite being criticized for lacking experience and having few accomplishments during his short stint as a senator, he is still the most appropriate person right now to lead this country among the presidential hopefuls. The presidency is now not a question of intelligence or lack of it as we have tried all those kinds of leaders in the past and yet the country still remains poor (if not become worse). They all failed to eradicate or at least curb the rampant corruption in the government which is basically the very basic reason which hampers the country's progress.

For a number of reasons aside from his own claims of no corruption, Aquino has some signs or indicators of non- or less corrupt administration. First, his current assets and lifestyle speak for contentment in life--his current assets is only roughly 14 million. Second, he did not intend in the first place to run as president even when his mom died were it not for the public clamor, and he even took some time to decide. Thirdly, he has a family legacy to protect, and a slight anomaly will definitely ruin or disgrace his parents; this I believe he will not allow but rather he will boost further.

CASE DIGEST in Transportation Law: PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. vs. MGG MARINE SERVICES, INC. (G.R. No. 135645, March 8, 2002)

FACTS: On March 1, 1987, San Miguel Corporation insured several beer bottle cases with petitioner Philippine American General Insurance Company. The cargo were loaded on board the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G to be transported from Mandaue City to Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
After having been cleared by the Coast Guard Station in Cebu the previous day, the vessel left the port of Mandaue City for Bislig, Surigao del Sur on March 2, 1987. The weather was calm when the vessel started its voyage.

The following day, M/V Peatheray Patrick-G listed and subsequently sunk off Cawit Point, Cortes, Surigao del Sur. As a consequence thereof, the cargo belonging to San Miguel Corporation was lost.

Petitioner paid San Miguel Corporation the full amount of the cargo pursuant to the terms of their insurance contract, and as subrogee filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City a case for collection against private respondents to recover the amount it paid.

Meanwhile, the Board of Marine Inquiry conducted its own investigation and found that the cause of the sinking of the vessel was the existence of strong winds and enormous waves in Surigao del Sur, a fortuitous event that could not have been for seen at the time the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G left the port of Mandaue City. It was further held by the Board that said fortuitous event was the proximate and only cause of the vessel's sinking.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent MGG should be held liable.

HELD: No. [Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are mandated to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them. Owing to this high degree of diligence required of them, common carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to have been at fault or negligent if the goods transported by them are lost, destroyed or if the same deteriorated.

However, this presumption of fault or negligence does not arise in the cases enumerated under Article 1734 of the Civil Code:

Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity;(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;(5) Order or act of competent public authority.]

In order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability where the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods is due to a natural disaster or calamity, it must further be shown that the such natural disaster or calamity was the proximate and only cause of the loss; there must be "an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of the injury of the loss."Moreover, even in cases where a natural disaster is the proximate and only cause of the loss, a common carrier is still required to exercise due diligence to prevent or minimize loss before, during and after the occurrence of the natural disaster, for it to be exempt from liability under the law for the loss of the goods. If a common carrier fails to exercise due diligence--or that ordinary care which the circumstances of the particular case demand -- to preserve and protect the goods carried by it on the occasion of a natural disaster, it will be deemed to have been negligent, and the loss will not be considered as having been due to a natural disaster under Article 1734 (1).

[In the case at bar, the issues may be narrowed down to whether the loss of the cargo was due to the occurrence of a natural disaster, and if so, whether such natural disaster was the sole and proximate cause of the loss or whether private respondents were partly to blame for failing to exercise due diligence to prevent the loss of the cargo.

The parties do not dispute that on the day the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G sunk, said vessel encountered strong winds and huge waves ranging from six to ten feet in height. The vessel listed at the port side and eventually sunk at Cawit Point, Cortes, Surigao del Sur.

The Court of Appeals, citing the decision of the Board of Marine Inquiry in the administrative case against the vessel's crew (BMI--646-87), found that the loss of the cargo was due solely to the existence of a fortuitous event, particularly the presence of strong winds and huge waves at Cortes, Surigao del Sur on March 3, 1987:]

CASE DIGEST in Transportaion Law: Zamboanga Transportation Co. vs. CA

GR L-25292, 29 November 1969)

FACTS: In the evening of 13 August 1955, the spouses Ramon and Josefina Dagamanuel boarded a bus at Manicahan, Zamboanga City, to attend a benefit dance at the Bunguiao Elementary School, also in Zamboanga City, where Josefina was a public school teacher. After the dance, the couple boarded the same bus to return to Manicahan. At around 1 a.m. of 14 August 1955, the bus (1955 TPU-1137), and driven by Valeriano Marcos, fell off the road and pinned to death the said spouses and several other passengers.

Jose Mario Dagamanuel, the only child of the deceased spouses, through his maternal grandmother as guardian ad-litem, Pascuala Julian de Punzalan, instituted an action against Zamboanga Transportation Co., Inc. (Zamtanco) and the Zamboanga Rapids Co., Inc. (Zambraco) for breach of contract of carriage, alleging that the accident was due to the fault and negligence of the driver in operating the bus and due to the negligence of the companies in their supervision of their driver. the trial court rendered judgment sentencing the three, jointly and severally, to indemnify the private respondents. The CA affirmed the decision of the court a quo.

ISSUE: Whether or not Zamtranco and Zambraco are jointly and severally liable.

HELD: Yes.

While it is true that according to previous decisions of the Supreme Court, transfer of a certificate of public convenience to operate a transportation service is not effective and binding insofar as the responsibility of the grantee under the franchise in its relation to the public is concerned, without the approval of the transfer by the Public Service Commission required by the Public Service Act, and that in contemplation of law, the transferor of such certificate continues to be the operator of the service as long as the transfer is not yet approved, and as such operator, he is the one responsible jointly and severally with his driver for damages incurred by passengers or third persons in consequence of injuries or deaths resulting from the operation of such service, the Court does not find any need for applying these rulings to the present case for the simple reason that in their respective third-party complaints, the companies both admitted separately that they are the owners of the bus involved in the incident in question and that Valeriano Marcos, the driver of said bus at the time of said incident, was in their employ.

There is no application of the ruling in the previous cases to the present case. There, the registered owners invariably sought to pass on liability to the actual operators on the pretext that they had already sold or transferred their units to the latter, whereas in the present case, the registered owner, the Zambraco, admits whatever liability it has and vigorously objects to any finding that the actual operator, the Zamtranco, is also liable with it, claiming that as registered owner, it alone should be adjudged liable. We would not inquire into the motive of the Zambraco why instead of sharing whatever liability it has with the Zamtranco, it prefers to shoulder it alone. But the fact stands out in bold relief that although still the registered owner at the time of the accident, it had already sold the vehicle to Zamtranco and the latter was actually operating it.

For the better protection of the public that both the owner of record and the actual operator, as held by the Court in the past, should be adjudged jointly and severally liable with the driver (see Dizon vs. Octavio, et al., 51 O.G. No. 8, 4059-4061; Castanares vs. Pages, CA-G.R. 21809-R, March 8, 1962; Redado vs. Bautista, CA-G.R. 19295-R, Sept. 19, 1961; Bering vs. Noeth, CA-G.R. 28483-R, April 29, 1965).

SOME ASSESSMENTS ON THE 2010 PHILIPPINE ELECTION

The 2010 automated Election, being the first in our history, has tickled the curiosity of most Filipinos. It attracted both the active voters and the apathetics, and even people with disabilities; they all tried their bests to locate their respective precincts and excitedly queued amid the scorching heat. Some however went home frustrated after realizing that their names were delisted or deactivated due to failure to vote during the previous election. My mother and my elder brother are a first-hand experience in this kind of election problem. My brother even spent hours in the line before knowing that he is not in the master list of voters.

It may be asked why he lined up in the first place without first verifying his name which is supposedly the proper procedure. Actually, the truth of the matter is that, upon entering the school where our precinct is located, we noticed a number of clustered PPCRV volunteers who obviously were there to assist the public in locating their respective precincts. Without noticing the signs for respective barangays as they are written so small that an average adult might not even notice, we assumed that all PPCRV groups have the complete master list, and so we verified our names. The volunteer can't find our names, then asked what barangay do we belong. After hearing our answer he suddenly commented in a high voice and in an embarrassing manner that we are in the wrong place as we have to find the right barangay. Embarrassed by the sudden outburst, we lost our temper and we yelled back a her and even lashing at her as she is still uttering annoying comments. Irked, we disregarded the verifying and rather searched our familiar neighbors and there we just lined up.

As observed by many, the retrieval or counting was indeed fast. After casting my vote, and upon reaching home, news about partial unofficial results were already being reported in almost every tv station. After 7 pm, which is the official cut-off time for casting of votes, almost all precincts have already either transmitted the results or at least finished conducting the voting. I was so excited that my eyes were almost glued on the tv, as every minute modifies the numbers of the partial unofficial result. By 12 midnight, the votes counted were already substantial. It was really both amazing and exciting.

Just a day after, some national candidates, especially in the presidential race, are already conceding to leading candidates. This is far different from our previous elections -- and I thought this thing only happens in foreign elections. In the past, objections and protests are prevalent and are the common marks of Philippine Election, and concessions are but rather a boxing fight’s vocabulary.

Another observation is that, the automated election incrementally decreased the election related violence. The elimination of manual counting also reduced the chance of losing candidate’s tactic of disturbing the counting or instigating violence with the end in view of getting a declaration of failure of election, and hoping (or manipulating?) later to win in the special election. This also rendered obsolete the modus operandi of ballot snatching while on its way to the city or municipal hall. All that is left for them now is to buy votes.

First among the election problems, both old and new, is the turtle-moving queue where some voters spent long hours before finally casting their votes. I, for one, started to fall in line around 11 am, and it was already 4 pm when I finally cast my vote. This is properly attributable either to lack of PCOS machine or to small classroom space. The COMELEC should have added extra PCOS machines to high volume clusters, or at least used a bigger area and increased the number of simultaneous voters.

Second is the perennial problem of missing names in the voter’s list or deactivated names for failure to vote last election. An announcement was allegedly made for them to reactivate during the registration period. But the fact that still many of them were unaware of it means that the information campaign was not sufficient if not ineffective. My brother who is a lawyer is one of those who never heard of that fact. An intensive campaign should have been employed.

Third is the failure or malfunctioning of some PCOS machines. This however should be imputed to SMARTMATIC-TIM for being negligent in ensuring the quality of the machines before being deployed to different parts of the country.

Fourth is vote buying: another classic poll cheating strategy. This is one of the areas where the impact of the automation is very negative. This is because the automation rendered the manual counting-associated violations obsolete but on the other it just shifted the black ops funds into this kind of violation. But unlike others, the blame here also extends to voters.

Fifth, the high-tech rigging by switching of flash drives, intercepting transmitted data, etc. These allegations arose only after almost all votes have been counted and local winning candidates have been proclaimed.

These are just some of the major problems observed, and certainly, there are a lot more. But on the positive side, at least we have significantly improved compared to past election in terms of the speed of counting which effectively lessened poll-related violence and some cheatings consistently identified with manual counting.

How to Answer Law School Exams

1. If the facts are specific, do not qualify your answer. Answers must be responsive to the question.

2.Organize your paragraphs. I suggest you use the inverted pyramid structure which means that you must place the topic sentence (the most fundamental or relevant facts which answers the question) at the top. The non-essential or supporting information should then follow. Get to the point immediately, then follow through with your bases.

"It's also an extremely useful tool for thinking and organizing because it forces the reporter to sum up the point of the story in a single paragraph. Journalism students who master it and then go on to other fields say it comes in handy for writing everything from legal briefs to grant applications."
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CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Valenzuela Hardwood vs. CA

(GR 102316, 30 June 1997)
FACTS:
Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc. (VHIS) entered into an agreement with the Seven Brothers whereby the latter undertook to load on board its vessel M/V Seven Ambassador the former’s lauan round logs numbering 940 at the port of Maconacon, Isabela for shipment to Manila. VHIS insured the logs against loss and/or damage with South Sea Surety and Insurance Co.

The said vessel sank resulting in the loss of VHIS’ insured logs. VHIS demanded from South Sea Surety the payment of the proceeds of the policy but the latter denied liability under the policy for non-payment of premium. VHIS likewise filed a formal claim with Seven Brothers for the value of the lost logs but the latter denied the claim.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner.Both Seven Brothers and South Sea Surety appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment except as to the liability of Seven Brothers.South Sea Surety and VHIS filed separate petitions for review before the Supreme Court. In a Resolution dated 2 June 1995, the Supreme Court denied the petition of South Sea Surety. The present decision concerns itself to the petition for review filed by VHIS.

ISSUE:
Is a stipulation in a charter party that the “(o)wners shall not be responsible for loss, split, short-landing, breakages and any kind of damages to the cargo” valid?

HELD:
Yes. Xxx [I]t is undisputed that private respondent had acted as a private carrier in transporting petitioner’s lauan logs. Thus, Article 1745 and other Civil Code provisions on common carriers which were cited by petitioner may not be applied unless expressly stipulated by the parties in their charter party.

In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer, exempting the shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 of the Civil Code, such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract of private carriage is not even a contract of adhesion. We stress that in a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier. Consequently, the public policy embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in contracts involving common carriers.

x x x

The general public enters into a contract of transportation with common carriers without a hand or a voice in the preparation thereof. The riding public merely adheres to the contract; even if the public wants to, it cannot submit its own stipulations for the approval of the common carrier. Thus, the law on common carriers extends its protective mantle against one-sided stipulations inserted in tickets, invoices or other documents over which the riding public has no understanding or, worse, no choice. Compared to the general public, a charterer in a contract of private carriage is not similarly situated. It can -- and in fact it usually does -- enter into a free and voluntary agreement. In practice, the parties in a contract of private carriage can stipulate the carrier’s obligations and liabilities over the shipment which, in turn, determine the price or consideration of the charter. Thus, a charterer, in exchange for convenience and economy, may opt to set aside the protection of the law on common carriers. When the charterer decides to exercise this option, he takes a normal business risk.

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): TABACALERA vs. NORTH FRONT SHIPPING SERVICES

TABACALERA INSURANCE CO., PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE & ASSURANCE, INC., and NEW ZEALAND INSURANCE CO., LTD. vs. NORTH FRONT SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., and COURT OF APPEALS


[G.R. No. 119197. May 16, 1997]

FACTS:
Petitioners are insurers of a shipment of sacks of corn grains consigned to Republic Flour Mills Corporation in Manila. The cargo was shipped by North Front Shipping Services, Inc. The consignee was advised of its arrival but the unloading was delayed for six days for unknown reason, and the merchandise was already moldy, rancid and deteriorating.

The moisture content and the wetting was due to contact with salt water but the mold growth was only incipient and not sufficient to make the corn grains toxic and unfit for consumption. In fact the mold growth could still be arrested by drying. However, Republic Flour rejected the entire cargo which therefore forced the petitioners to pay the former.

Now, as subrogees, they lodged a complaint for damages against respondents claiming that the loss was exclusively attributable to the fault and negligence of the carrier. The Marine Cargo Adjusters hired by the insurance companies conducted a survey and found cracks in the bodega of the barge and heavy concentration of molds on the tarpaulins and wooden boards. They did not notice any seals in the hatches. The tarpaulins were not brand new as there were patches on them, contrary to the claim of North Front Shipping Services, Inc., thus making it possible for water to seep in. They also discovered that the bulkhead of the barge was rusty.

The trial court dismissed the complaint and ruled that the contract entered into between North Front Shipping Services, Inc., and Republic Flour Mills Corporation was a charter-party agreement. As such, only ordinary diligence in the care of goods was required. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that as a common carrier required to observe a higher degree of diligence North Front 777 satisfactorily complied with all the requirements hence was issued a Permit to Sail after proper inspection.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a charter-party agreement between P and R requires extraordinary diligence.

HELD:
Yes. The charter-party agreement between North Front Shipping Services, Inc., and Republic Flour Mills Corporation did not in any way convert the common carrier into a private carrier.

x x x

North Front Shipping Services, Inc., is a corporation engaged in the business of transporting cargo and offers its services indiscriminately to the public. It is without doubt a common carrier. As such it is required to observe extraordinary diligence in its vigilance over the goods it transports. When goods placed in its care are lost or damaged, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. North Front Shipping Services, Inc., therefore has the burden of proving that it observed extraordinary diligence in order to avoid responsibility for the lost cargo.

However, we cannot attribute the destruction, loss or deterioration of the cargo solely to the carrier. We find the consignee Republic Flour Mills Corporation guilty of contributory negligence. It was seasonably notified of the arrival of the barge but did not immediately start the unloading operations. No explanation was proffered by the consignee as to why there was a delay of six (6) days. Had the unloading been commenced immediately the loss could have been completely avoided or at least minimized. As testified to by the chemist who analyzed the corn samples, the mold growth was only at its incipient stage and could still be arrested by drying. The corn grains were not yet toxic or unfit for consumption.

CASE DIGEST (Credit Transactions): ACME vs. Court of Appeals

ACME SHOE, RUBBER & PLASTIC CORPORATION and CHUA PAC vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and REGIONAL SHERIFF OF CALOOCAN CITY

G.R. No. 103576 August 22, 1996

FACTS:
Petitioner Chua Pac, the president and general manager of co-petitioner Acme executed a chattel mortgage in favor of private respondent Producers Bank as a security for a loan of P3,000,000. A provision in the chattel mortgage agreement was to this effect:

"In case the MORTGAGOR executes subsequent promissory note or notes either as a renewal of the former note, as an extension thereof, or as a new loan, or is given any other kind of accommodations such as overdrafts, letters of credit, acceptances and bills of exchange, releases of import shipments on Trust Receipts, etc., this mortgage shall also stand as security for the payment of the said promissory note or notes and/or accommodations without the necessity of executing a new contract and this mortgage shall have the same force and effect as if the said promissory note or notes and/or accommodations were existing on the date thereof. This mortgage shall also stand as security for said obligations and any and all other obligations of the MORTGAGOR to the MORTGAGEE of whatever kind and nature, whether such obligations have been contracted before, during or after the constitution of this mortgage."

In due time, the loan of P3,000,000.00 was paid. Subsequently it obtained additional loan totalling P2,700,000.00 which was also duly paid.

Another loan was again extended (P1,000,000.00) covered by four promissory notes for P250,000.00 each, but went unsettled prompting the bank to apply for an extrajudicial foreclosure with the Sheriff.

ISSUE:
Would it be valid and effective to have a clause in a chattel mortgage that purports to likewise extend its coverage to obligations yet to be contracted or incurred?

HELD:
No. While a pledge, real estate mortgage, or antichresis may exceptionally secure after-incurred obligations so long as these future debts are accurately described, a chattel mortgage, however, can only cover obligations existing at the time the mortgage is constituted. Although a promise expressed in a chattel mortgage to include debts that are yet to be contracted can be a binding commitment that can be compelled upon, the security itself, however, does not come into existence or arise until after a chattel mortgage agreement covering the newly contracted debt is executed either by concluding a fresh chattel mortgage or by amending the old contract conformably with the form prescribed by the Chattel Mortgage Law. Refusal on the part of the borrower to execute the agreement so as to cover the after-incurred obligation can constitute an act of default on the part of the borrower of the financing agreement whereon the promise is written but, of course, the remedy of foreclosure can only cover the debts extant at the time of constitution and during the life of the chattel mortgage sought to be foreclosed.

CASE DIGEST (Commercial Law): Intengan vs. CA

Intengan vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 128996. February 15, 2002

Facts:
On September 21, 1993, Citibank filed a complaint for violation of section 31 in relation to section 144 of the Corporation Code against two (2) of its officers, Dante L. Santos and Marilou Genuino. Attached to the complaint was an affidavit executed by private respondent Vic Lim, a vice-president of Citibank

As evidence, Lim annexed bank records purporting to establish the deception practiced by Santos and Genuino. Some of the documents pertained to the dollar deposits of petitioners Carmen Ll. Intengan, Rosario Ll. Neri, and Rita P. Brawner.

In turn, private respondent Joven Reyes, vice-president/business manager of the Global Consumer Banking Group of Citibank, admits to having authorized Lim to state the names of the clients involved and to attach the pertinent bank records, including those of petitioners’

Petitioners aver that respondents violated RA 1405.

Issue:
Whether or not Respondents are liable for violation of Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, RA 1405.

Held:
No. The accounts in question are U.S. dollar deposits; consequently, the applicable law is not Republic Act No. 1405 but Republic Act (RA) No. 6426, known as the “Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines,” However, applying Act No. 3326, the offense prescribes in eight years, therefore, per available records, private respondents may no longer be haled before the courts for violation of Republic Act No. 6426.

CASE DIGEST (Commercial Law): Marquez vs. Disierto

G.R. No. 135882 June 27, 2001

FACTS: Respondent Ombudsman Desierto ordered petitioner Marquez to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager.

The order is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.

Petitioner wanted to be clarified first as to how she would comply with the orders without her breaking any law, particularly RA. No. 1405.

ISSUE:
Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405).

HELD: No.
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case

CASE DIGEST (Commercial Law) Banco Filipino vs. Purisima

G.R. No. L-56429 May 28, 1988

FACTS:
Customs special agent Manuel Caturla is accused by the Bureau of Internal Revenue of having violated R.A. No. 3019 of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" for having allegedly acquired property manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income. In the course of the preliminary investigation thereof, the Tanodbayan issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, commanding its representative to appear at a specified time at the Office of the Tanodbayan and furnish the latter with duly certified copies of the records in all its branches and extension offices, of the loans, savings and time deposits and other banking transactions, dating back to 1969, appearing in the names of Caturla, his wife, Purita Caturla, their children — Manuel, Jr., Marilyn and Michael — and/or Pedro Escuyos.

Caturla moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum but was denied by Tanodbayan Vicente Ericta.Petitioner Banco Filipino filed a complaint for declaratory relief with the Court of First Instance of Manila but was denied for lack of merit by respondent Judge Purisima.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RA 1405 "Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits" precludes production by subpoena duces tecum of bank records of transactions by or in the names of the wife, children and friends of a special agent of the Bureau of Customs, accused before the Tanodbayan of having allegedly acquired property manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income, in violation of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act".

HELD:
No. The inquiry into illegally acquired property — or property NOT "legitimately acquired" — extends to cases where such property is concealed by being held by or recorded in the name of other persons. This proposition is made clear by R.A. No. 3019 which quite categorically states that the term, "legitimately acquired property of a public officer or employee shall not include .. property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the name of, or held by, respondent's spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives or any other persons."

To sustain the petitioner's theory, and restrict the inquiry only to property held by or in the name of the government official or employee, or his spouse and unmarried children is unwarranted in the light of the provisions of the statutes in question, and would make available to persons in government who illegally acquire property an easy and fool-proof means of evading investigation and prosecution; all they would have to do would be to simply place the property in the possession or name of persons other than their spouse and unmarried children. This is an absurdity that we will not ascribe to the lawmakers

CASE DIGEST (Commercial Law): CHINA BANKING CORP vs. Ortega

G.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973

Facts:
Petitioner refuses to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 (Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) which allegedly prohibits the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits.

Issue:
Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.

Held:
No. It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank

CASE DIGEST (Commercial Law): PNB vs. Gancayco

G.R. No. L-18343 September 30, 1965

FACTS:
Defendants Emilio Gancayco and Florentino Flor, as special prosecutors of the Department of Justice, required the plaintiff Philippine National Bank to produce at a hearing the records of the bank deposits of Ernesto Jimenez, former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Administration, who was then under investigation for unexplained wealth. In declining to reveal its records, the plaintiff bank invoked Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405.

On the other hand, the defendants cited Section 8 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) in support of their claim of authority,which allegedly provides an additional ground for the examination of bank deposits.

ISSUE:
Whether Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides an additional ground for the examination of bank deposits.

HELD:
Yes. The truth is that these laws are so repugnant to each other than no reconciliation is possible. x x x. The only conclusion possible is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by providing additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits.

x x x [W]hile section 2 of Republic Act 1405 declares bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential," it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following instances:
(1) Upon written permission of the depositor;
(2) In cases of impeachment;
(3) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials;
(4) In cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty x x x.

Tax on ‘ROI’ in a corporation

Tax on ‘ROI’ in a corporation
By Atty. Rester John Lao Nonato
Cebu Daily News
First Posted 09:52:00 04/09/2010

AS the economy improves, many of us are in a “look-out” mode for new places to invest our hard earned money other than the banks.

One choice is to invest in corporations. However, one’s return of investment in corporations in the form of dividends is taxed in the Tax Code.

Dividends comprise any distribution whether in cash or other property in the ordinary course of business made by a domestic corporation to its shareholders out of its earnings or profit [Section 250 of Revenue Regulations (“RR”) No. 2]. Dividends must come from the unappropriated retained earnings of the corporation.

Cash dividends and property dividends are subject to the final withholding dividends tax, whereas stock dividends are generally exempt from tax.

The amount of tax payable would depend on the status of the stockholder, whether they are Filipino citizens, resident alien individuals, non-resident alien individuals, or non-resident foreign corporations.

Nevertheless, dividends received by a domestic corporation and a resident foreign corporation from another domestic corporation are exempt from the dividends tax.

When cash dividends or property dividends are declared, such cash or property previously owned by the corporation becomes the absolute property of the stockholders.

Property dividends may be investments in shares of stocks of a corporation, real property, or some other property owned by the corporation. The declaration of such types of dividends would decrease the assets of the corporation.

The issuance of stock dividends on the other hand will increase the number of shares issued and outstanding in the corporation that declared said dividends. A stock dividend, when declared is merely a certificate of stock which shows the interest of the stockholder in the increased capital of the corporation.

As mentioned earlier, the issuance of stock dividends is generally exempt from tax.

A stock dividend constitutes taxable income if it gives the shareholder a higher interest compared with what his former stockholdings represented.

On the other hand, a stock dividend does not constitute taxable income if the new shares did not confer new rights nor interests than those previously existing, and that the recipient owns the same proportionate interest in the net assets of the corporation (Section 252 of RR No. 2; Mertens' Federal Income Taxation, Vol. 1, par. 9.91, p. 145).



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