(GR 102316, 30 June 1997)
FACTS:
Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc. (VHIS) entered into an agreement with the Seven Brothers whereby the latter undertook to load on board its vessel M/V Seven Ambassador the former’s lauan round logs numbering 940 at the port of Maconacon, Isabela for shipment to Manila. VHIS insured the logs against loss and/or damage with South Sea Surety and Insurance Co.
The said vessel sank resulting in the loss of VHIS’ insured logs. VHIS demanded from South Sea Surety the payment of the proceeds of the policy but the latter denied liability under the policy for non-payment of premium. VHIS likewise filed a formal claim with Seven Brothers for the value of the lost logs but the latter denied the claim.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner.Both Seven Brothers and South Sea Surety appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment except as to the liability of Seven Brothers.South Sea Surety and VHIS filed separate petitions for review before the Supreme Court. In a Resolution dated 2 June 1995, the Supreme Court denied the petition of South Sea Surety. The present decision concerns itself to the petition for review filed by VHIS.
ISSUE:
Is a stipulation in a charter party that the “(o)wners shall not be responsible for loss, split, short-landing, breakages and any kind of damages to the cargo” valid?
HELD:
Yes. Xxx [I]t is undisputed that private respondent had acted as a private carrier in transporting petitioner’s lauan logs. Thus, Article 1745 and other Civil Code provisions on common carriers which were cited by petitioner may not be applied unless expressly stipulated by the parties in their charter party.
In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer, exempting the shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 of the Civil Code, such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract of private carriage is not even a contract of adhesion. We stress that in a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier. Consequently, the public policy embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in contracts involving common carriers.
x x x
The general public enters into a contract of transportation with common carriers without a hand or a voice in the preparation thereof. The riding public merely adheres to the contract; even if the public wants to, it cannot submit its own stipulations for the approval of the common carrier. Thus, the law on common carriers extends its protective mantle against one-sided stipulations inserted in tickets, invoices or other documents over which the riding public has no understanding or, worse, no choice. Compared to the general public, a charterer in a contract of private carriage is not similarly situated. It can -- and in fact it usually does -- enter into a free and voluntary agreement. In practice, the parties in a contract of private carriage can stipulate the carrier’s obligations and liabilities over the shipment which, in turn, determine the price or consideration of the charter. Thus, a charterer, in exchange for convenience and economy, may opt to set aside the protection of the law on common carriers. When the charterer decides to exercise this option, he takes a normal business risk.
FACTS:
Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc. (VHIS) entered into an agreement with the Seven Brothers whereby the latter undertook to load on board its vessel M/V Seven Ambassador the former’s lauan round logs numbering 940 at the port of Maconacon, Isabela for shipment to Manila. VHIS insured the logs against loss and/or damage with South Sea Surety and Insurance Co.
The said vessel sank resulting in the loss of VHIS’ insured logs. VHIS demanded from South Sea Surety the payment of the proceeds of the policy but the latter denied liability under the policy for non-payment of premium. VHIS likewise filed a formal claim with Seven Brothers for the value of the lost logs but the latter denied the claim.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner.Both Seven Brothers and South Sea Surety appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment except as to the liability of Seven Brothers.South Sea Surety and VHIS filed separate petitions for review before the Supreme Court. In a Resolution dated 2 June 1995, the Supreme Court denied the petition of South Sea Surety. The present decision concerns itself to the petition for review filed by VHIS.
ISSUE:
Is a stipulation in a charter party that the “(o)wners shall not be responsible for loss, split, short-landing, breakages and any kind of damages to the cargo” valid?
HELD:
Yes. Xxx [I]t is undisputed that private respondent had acted as a private carrier in transporting petitioner’s lauan logs. Thus, Article 1745 and other Civil Code provisions on common carriers which were cited by petitioner may not be applied unless expressly stipulated by the parties in their charter party.
In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer, exempting the shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 of the Civil Code, such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract of private carriage is not even a contract of adhesion. We stress that in a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier. Consequently, the public policy embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in contracts involving common carriers.
x x x
The general public enters into a contract of transportation with common carriers without a hand or a voice in the preparation thereof. The riding public merely adheres to the contract; even if the public wants to, it cannot submit its own stipulations for the approval of the common carrier. Thus, the law on common carriers extends its protective mantle against one-sided stipulations inserted in tickets, invoices or other documents over which the riding public has no understanding or, worse, no choice. Compared to the general public, a charterer in a contract of private carriage is not similarly situated. It can -- and in fact it usually does -- enter into a free and voluntary agreement. In practice, the parties in a contract of private carriage can stipulate the carrier’s obligations and liabilities over the shipment which, in turn, determine the price or consideration of the charter. Thus, a charterer, in exchange for convenience and economy, may opt to set aside the protection of the law on common carriers. When the charterer decides to exercise this option, he takes a normal business risk.
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