Sandiganbayan Convicts A Prosecutor for Bribery

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"Dagupan prosecutor convicted of bribery"

By Tetch Torres
INQUIRER.net
First Posted 17:31:00 03/24/2011
Filed Under: Judiciary (system of justice), Graft & Corruption, Bribery

MANILA, Philippines--The Sandiganbayan has convicted a Dagupan City public prosecutor for demanding and receiving P20,000 bribe money from a person who had a pending case before his office in 2005.

In a 30-page decision released Thursday, the anti-graft court’s fourth division, through Associate Justice Maria Cristina Cornejo, found Assistant Prosecutor Joselito Barrozo guilty of direct bribery and sentenced him to four to nine years, four months and one day of imprisonment.

Barrozo was also slapped a P60,000 fine, and he cannot exercise his right to vote and hold public office during the duration of his sentence.

Barrozo was arrested in February 2005 in an entrapment operation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation after a complaint was filed by Jennie Valeriano, a respondent to several estafa and bouncing checks cases pending before Barrozo’s office.

Barrozo dismissed the estafa cases and demanded from Valeriano the said amount as his fee in resolving the case in her favor.

“Accused Barrozo accepted the money given to him by Valeriano under obviously suspicious circumstances. The money, as categorically stated by the giver (Valeriano), was given to and received by Barrozo in consideration of the dismissal of the cases which were the subject of preliminary investigation conducted by Barrozo…,” the decision stated.

The decision further said that “Barrozo’s act did not constitute a crime but was unjust as it was executed without regard to the evidence but simply in consideration of the amount demanded and received by him.”

PUP Law Professor Appointed as Court of Appeals Justice

Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Zenaida G. Laguilles who has been teaching remedial law for years at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) College of Law in Sta. Mesa, Manila was appointed just recently as an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.

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3 career judges take oath as new CA justices By Tetch Torres
INQUIRER.net
First Posted 12:52:00 03/22/2011
Filed Under: Benigno Aquino III, Judiciary (system of justice)

MANILA, Philippines—Three career judges took their oath before Chief Justice Renato Corona as the newly appointed Court of Appeals justices filling up the remaining three vacant posts in the appellate court.

The appointment was contained in a one page transmittal letter to the Supreme Court dated Mar. 21, 2011 of Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa Jr.

Appointed as new appeals court justices were Manila Regional Trial Court Judge Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan, Makati RTC Judge Zenaida Galapate Laguilles and Cavite City RTC Judge Melchor Quirino C. Sadang.

Both Manahan and Laguilles have immediately taken their oath before Corona late Monday afternoon.

Manahan, a graduate of Manuel L. Quezon University passed the Bar exam in 1990. She worked at the Public Attorney’s Office then became a prosecutor before her stint as a judge. She was once a Judicial Excellence Awardee of the Justice Ramon Avancena Award, the highest honor given by the high court to career judges.

Laguilles meanwhile is an expert in Remedial Law. She teaches law in various law schools including the Polytechnic University of the Philippines.

She handled the case of the journalists who filed a P12.5 million class suit against First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo on 28 December 2006 accusing him of abuse of right when he filed 11 libel suits against 46 mediamen. Laguilles junked Arroyo’s motion to dismiss the case.

Sadang, on the other hand, is the son of the late Judge Quirino Sadang. He is a member of the Upsilon Fraternity in the University of the Philippines, the fraternity group where the late President Ferdinand Marcos and Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino Jr. belonged.

Earlier, President Benigno Aquino III already made appointments to fill up vacant seats at the Court of Appeals which included former Pasig RTC Abraham Borreta and Caloocan City RTC Judge Victoria Paredes, Cebu RTC Judge Gabriel Ingles and Pamela Ann Abella- Maxino.

The Court of Appeals is composed of 1 Presiding Justice and 68 Associate Justices pursuant to Republic Act 8246.

SOURCE: Inquirer.net

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Lita Enterprises vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

LITA ENTERPRISES, INC., vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, NICASIO M. OCAMPO and FRANCISCA P. GARCIA.
[G.R. No. L-64693 April 27, 1984]

FACTS:
Sometime in 1966, the spouses Nicasio M. Ocampo and Francisca Garcia, herein private respondents, purchased in installment from the Delta Motor Sales Corporation five (5) Toyota Corona Standard cars to be used as taxicabs. Since they had no franchise to operate taxicabs, they contracted with petitioner Lita Enterprises, Inc., through its representative, Manuel Concordia, for the use of the latter's certificate of public convenience in consideration of an initial payment of P1,000.00 and a monthly rental of P200.00 per taxicab unit. To effectuate Id agreement, the aforesaid cars were registered in the name of petitioner Lita Enterprises, Inc, Possession, however, remained with tile spouses Ocampo who operated and maintained the same under the name Acme Taxi, petitioner's trade name.

About a year later one of said taxicabs driven by their employee, Emeterio Martin, collided with a motorcycle whose driver, one Florante Galvez, died from the head injuries sustained therefrom. A criminal case was eventually filed against the driver Emeterio Martin, while a civil case for damages was instituted by Rosita Sebastian Vda. de Galvez, heir of the victim, against Lita Enterprises, Inc., as registered owner of the taxicab in the latter case. Petitioner Lita Enterprises, Inc. was adjudged liable for damages by the CFI.

This decision having become final, a writ of execution was issued. Two of the vehicles of respondent spouses were levied upon and sold at public auction.

Thereafter, Nicasio Ocampo decided to register his taxicabs in his name. He requested the manager of petitioner Lita Enterprises, Inc. to turn over the registration papers to him, but the latter allegedly refused. Hence, he and his wife filed a complaint against Lita Enterprises, Inc., Mrs. de Galvez and the Sheriff of Manila for reconveyance of motor vehicles with damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has a cause of action against defendants.

HELD:
No.
Unquestionably, the parties herein operated under an arrangement, commonly known as the "kabit system", whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of convenience allows another person who owns motors vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee. A certificate of public convenience is a special privilege conferred by the government . Abuse of this privilege by the grantees thereof cannot be countenanced. The "kabit system" has been Identified as one of the root causes of the prevalence of graft and corruption in the government transportation offices. In the words of Chief Justice Makalintal, "this is a pernicious system that cannot be too severely condemned. It constitutes an imposition upon the goo faith of the government.

Although not outrightly penalized as a criminal offense, the "kabit system" is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and, therefore, void and inexistent under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, It is a fundamental principle that the court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave them both where it finds them. Upon this premise, it was flagrant error on the part of both the trial and appellate courts to have accorded the parties relief from their predicament. Article 1412 of the Civil Code denies them such aid. It provides:

ART. 1412. if the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:

(1) when the fault, is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's undertaking.

Having entered into an illegal contract, neither can seek relief from the courts, and each must bear the consequences of his acts.

The defect of inexistence of a contract is permanent and incurable, and cannot be cured by ratification or by prescription. As this Court said in Eugenio v. Perdido, "the mere lapse of time cannot give efficacy to contracts that are null void."

The principle of in pari delicto is well known not only in this jurisdiction but also in the United States where common law prevails. Under American jurisdiction, the doctrine is stated thus: "The proposition is universal that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or damages for its property agreed to be sold or delivered, or damages for its violation. The rule has sometimes been laid down as though it was equally universal, that where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the other." Although certain exceptions to the rule are provided by law, We see no cogent reason why the full force of the rule should not be applied in the instant case.

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Garcia

KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER vs.HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994

FACTS :
Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year.

This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 providing, among others, that "The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare range."

Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares.

On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares, which the LTFRB dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal.

HELD:
Yes.

x x x

Under section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. x x x However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service.

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Bantangas CATV vs. C.A.

BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CITY MAYOR [G.R. No. 138810. September 29, 2004]

FACTS:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, “provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.

Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.

Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.

ISSUE :
may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction?

HELD: No.

x x x

The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.

x x x

Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system – the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions – allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators.

x x x

But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the State’s deregulation policy over the CATV industry.

LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association vs. C.A.

COGEO-CUBAO OPERATORS AND DRIVERS ASSOCIATION vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, LUNGSOD SILANGAN TRANSPORT SERVICES, CORP., INC.
G.R. No. 100727 March 18, 1992

FACTS:
It appears that a certificate of public convenience to operate a jeepney service was ordered to be issued in favor of Lungsod Silangan to ply the Cogeo-Cubao route sometime in 1983 on the justification that public necessity and convenience will best be served, and in the absence of existing authorized operators on the lined apply for . . . On the other hand, defendant-Association was registered as a non-stock, non-profit organization with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 30, 1985 . . . with the main purpose of representing plaintiff-appellee for whatever contract and/or agreement it will have regarding the ownership of units, and the like, of the members of the Association . . .

Perturbed by plaintiffs' Board Resolution No. 9 . . . adopting a Bandera' System under which a member of the cooperative is permitted to queue for passenger at the disputed pathway in exchange for the ticket worth twenty pesos, the proceeds of which shall be utilized for Christmas programs of the drivers and other benefits, and on the strength of defendants' registration as a collective body with the Securities and Exchange Commission, defendants-appellants, led by Romeo Oliva decided to form a human barricade on November 11, 1985 and assumed the dispatching of passenger jeepneys . . . This development as initiated by defendants-appellants gave rise to the suit for damages.

Defendant-Association's Answer contained vehement denials to the insinuation of take over and at the same time raised as a defense the circumstance that the organization was formed not to compete with plaintiff-cooperative. It, however, admitted that it is not authorized to transport passengers . . .

ISSUE :
Whether or not the petitioner usurped the property right of the respondent.

HELD:
Yes.

x x x

Under the Public Service Law, a certificate of public convenience is an authorization issued by the Public Service Commission for the operation of public services for which no franchise is required by law. In the instant case, a certificate of public convenience was issued to respondent corporation on January 24, 1983 to operate a public utility jeepney service on the Cogeo-Cubao route. x x x

A certification of public convenience is included in the term "property" in the broad sense of the term. Under the Public Service Law, a certificate of public convenience can be sold by the holder thereof because it has considerable material value and is considered as valuable asset (Raymundo v. Luneta Motor Co., et al., 58 Phil. 889). Although there is no doubt that it is private property, it is affected with a public interest and must be submitted to the control of the government for the common good (Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. PSC, 70 Phil 221). Hence, insofar as the interest of the State is involved, a certificate of public convenience does not confer upon the holder any proprietary right or interest or franchise in the route covered thereby and in the public highways (Lugue v. Villegas, L-22545, Nov . 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 409). However, with respect to other persons and other public utilities, a certificate of public convenience as property, which represents the right and authority to operate its facilities for public service, cannot be taken or interfered with without due process of law. Appropriate actions may be maintained in courts by the holder of the certificate against those who have not been authorized to operate in competition with the former and those who invade the rights which the former has pursuant to the authority granted by the Public Service Commission (A.L. Ammen Transportation Co. v. Golingco. 43 Phil. 280).

In the case at bar, the trial court found that petitioner association forcibly took over the operation of the jeepney service in the Cogeo-Cubao route without any authorization from the Public Service Commission and in violation of the right of respondent corporation to operate its services in the said route under its certificate of public convenience.

CASE DIGEST (Commercial Law): Santos vs. Sibug

ADOLFO L. SANTOS vs. ABRAHAM SIBUG and COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-26815 May 26, 19810

FACTS:
Prior to April 26, 1963 (the ACCIDENT DATE), Vicente U. Vidad was a duly authorized passenger jeepney operator. Also prior to the ACCIDENT DATE, petitioner Adolfo L. Santos was the owner of a passenger jeep, but he had no certificate of public convenience for the operation of the vehicle as a public passenger jeep. SANTOS then transferred his jeep to the name of VIDAD so that it could be operated under the latter's certificate of public convenience. In other words, SANTOS became what is known in ordinary parlance as a kabit operator. For the protection of SANTOS, VIDAD executed a re-transfer document to the former, which was to be a private document presumably to be registered if and where it was decided that the passenger jeep of SANTOS was to be withdrawn from the kabit arrangement.

On the ACCIDENT DATE, private respondent Abraham Sibug was bumped by a passenger jeepney operated by VIDAD and driven by Severe Gragas. As a result thereof, SIBUG filed a complaint for damages against VIDAD and Gragas with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, and after trial sentenced VIDAD and Gragas, jointly and severally, to indemnify SIBUG.

On April 10, 1964, the Sheriff of Manila levied on a motor vehicle registered in the name of VIDAD.

SANTOS thereafter filed a third-party claim with the Sheriff alleging actual ownership of the motor vehicle levied upon, and stating that registration thereof in the name of VIDAD was merely to enable SANTOS to make use of VIDAD'S Certificate of Public Convenience.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Santos may prevent the levying of his vehicle.

HELD:
No.

x x x

In this case, SANTOS had fictitiously sold the jeepney to VIDAD, who had become the registered owner and operator of record at the time of the accident. It is true that VIDAD had executed a re-sale to SANTOS, but the document was not registered. Although SANTOS, as the kabit was the true owner as against VIDAD, the latter, as the registered owner/operator and grantee of the franchise, is directly and primarily responsible and liable for the damages caused to SIBUG, the injured party, as a consequence of the negligent or careless operation of the vehicle.] > This ruling is based on the principle that the operator of record is considered the operator of the vehicle in contemplation of law as regards the public and third persons even if the vehicle involved in the accident had been sold to another where such sale had not been approved by the then Public Service Commission. [ For the same basic reason, as the vehicle here in question was registered in VIDAD'S name, the levy on execution against said vehicle should be enforced so that the judgment in the BRANCH XVII CASE may be satisfied, notwithstanding the fact that the secret ownership of the vehicle belonged to another. SANTOS, as the kabit should not be allowed to defeat the levy on his vehicle and to avoid his responsibilities as a kabit owner for he had led the public to believe that the vehicle belonged to VIDAD. This is one way of curbing the pernicious kabit system that facilitates the commission of fraud against the travelling public.

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. Jureidini

BOHOL LAND TRANSPORTATION CO. vs.NAZARIO S. JUREIDINI G.R. No. 31244 September 23, 1929

FACTS:
This is a petition filed by the Bohol Land Transportation Co. praying for the review and reversal of an order issued by the Public Service Commission on November 23, 1928, admitting the application of respondent Nazario S. Jureidini, granting him a certificate of public necessity and convenience to operate regularly fourteen trucks in the Province of Bohol where the petitioner and appellant is a common carrier, and cancelling the authority given to the Bohol Land Transportation Co. in its certificate of public convenience and utility, to make special trips.

ISSUE:
Whether or not tha acts of the PSC are valid.

HELD:
No.

x x x

x x x [W]e are of opinion and so hold: (1) That before giving a certificate of public necessity and convenience to a transportation company or common land carrier, there being another in existence with the proper certificate, the latter must be given an opportunity to improve its service, should it be deficient or adequate; (2) that before a total or partial revocation of a certificate of public necessity and convenience, the party thereby affected must be notified and heared; (3) that the mere possession of a public mail contract is not a sufficient indication of the convenience and necessity of a new transportation line, and hence, will not sustain the issuance of a certificate of public necessity and convenience.

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Commissioner of Customs vs. CA

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 111202-05 January 31, 2006

FACTS:
The whole controversy revolves around a vessel and its cargo. On January 7, 1989, the vessel M/V "Star Ace," coming from Singapore laden with cargo, entered the Port of San Fernando, La Union (SFLU) for needed repairs. The vessel and the cargo had an appraised value, at that time, of more or less Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000). When the Bureau of Customs later became suspicious that the vessel’s real purpose in docking was to smuggle its cargo into the country, seizure proceedings were instituted under S.I. Nos. 02-89 and 03-89 and, subsequently, two Warrants of Seizure and Detention were issued for the vessel and its cargo.

Respondent Cesar S. Urbino, Sr., does not own the vessel or any of its cargo but claimed a preferred maritime lien under a Salvage Agreement dated June 8, 1989. To protect his claim, Urbino initially filed two motions in the seizure and detention cases: a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Lift Warrant of Seizure and Detention. Apparently not content with his administrative remedies, Urbino sought relief with the regular courts by filing a case for Prohibition, Mandamus and Damages before the RTC of SFLU, seeking to restrain the District Collector of Customs from interfering with his salvage operation. The RTC of SFLU dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because of the pending seizure and detention cases. Urbino then elevated the matter to the CA. The Commissioner of Customs, in response, filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, advising the CA that it intends to question the jurisdiction of the CA before this Court. The motion was denied. Hence, in this petition the Commissioner of Customs assails the Resolution "F" recited above and seeks to prohibit the CA from continuing to hear the case.

ISSUE:
Whether Urbino's claim is a preferred lien in this case.

HELD:
No.

x x x

First of all, the Court finds the decision of the RTC of Manila, in so far as it relates to the vessel M/V "Star Ace," to be void as jurisdiction was never acquired over the vessel. In filing the case, Urbino had impleaded the vessel as a defendant to enforce his alleged maritime lien. This meant that he brought an action in rem under the Code of Commerce under which the vessel may be attached and sold. However, the basic operative fact for the institution and perfection of proceedings in rem is the actual or constructive possession of the res by the tribunal empowered by law to conduct the proceedings. This means that to acquire jurisdiction over the vessel, as a defendant, the trial court must have obtained either actual or constructive possession over it. Neither was accomplished by the RTC of Manila.

In his comment to the petition, Urbino plainly stated that "petitioner has actual[sic] physical custody not only of the goods and/or cargo but the subject vessel, M/V Star Ace, as well." This is clearly an admission that the RTC of Manila did not have jurisdiction over the res. While Urbino contends that the Commissioner of Custom’s custody was illegal, such fact, even if true, does not deprive the Commissioner of Customs of jurisdiction thereon. This is a question that ought to be resolved in the seizure and forfeiture cases, which are now pending with the CTA, and not by the regular courts as a collateral matter to enforce his lien. By simply filing a case in rem against the vessel, despite its being in the custody of customs officials, Urbino has circumvented the rule that regular trial courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted in the Bureau of Customs, on his mere assertion that the administrative proceedings were a nullity.

On the other hand, the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the res ahead and to the exclusion of the RTC of Manila. The forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs are in the nature of proceedings in rem and jurisdiction was obtained from the moment the vessel entered the SFLU port. Moreover, there is no question that forfeiture proceedings were instituted and the vessel was seized even before the filing of the RTC of Manila case.

The Court is aware that Urbino seeks to enforce a maritime lien and, because of its nature, it is equivalent to an attachment from the time of its existence. Nevertheless, despite his lien’s constructive attachment, Urbino still cannot claim an advantage as his lien only came about after the warrant of seizure and detention was issued and implemented. The Salvage Agreement, upon which Urbino based his lien, was entered into on June 8, 1989. The warrants of seizure and detention, on the other hand, were issued on January 19 and 20, 1989. And to remove further doubts that the forfeiture case takes precedence over the RTC of Manila case, it should be noted that forfeiture retroacts to the date of the commission of the offense, in this case the day the vessel entered the country. A maritime lien, in contrast, relates back to the period when it first attached, in this case the earliest retroactive date can only be the date of the Salvage Agreement. Thus, when the vessel and its cargo are ordered forfeited, the effect will retroact to the moment the vessel entered Philippine waters.

Accordingly, the RTC of Manila decision never attained finality as to the defendant vessel, inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired over it, and the decision cannot be binding and the writ of execution issued in connection therewith is null and void.

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Marikina Auto Line transport Corp. vs. People

MARIKINA AUTO LINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION and FREDDIE L. SUELTO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ERLINDA V. VALDELLON
[G.R. No. 152040 March 31, 2006]

FACTS:
Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment located at No. 31 Kamias Road, Quezon City. The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the owner-operator of a passenger bus with Plate Number NCV-849. Suelto, its employee, was assigned as the regular driver of the bus.

At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was driving the aforementioned passenger bus along Kamias Road, Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). The bus suddenly swerved to the right and struck the terrace of the commercial apartment owned by Valdellon located along Kamuning Road. Valdellon demanded payment of P148,440.00 to cover the cost of the damage to the terrace. The bus company and Suelto offered a P30,000.00 settlement which Valdellon refused.

Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property against Suelto. Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint against Suelto and the bus company for damages. Suelto maintained that, in an emergency case, he was not, in law, negligent. Both the trial court and the CA ruled in against herein petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sudden emergency rule applies in the case at bar.

HELD:
No.

x x x

It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner Suelto’s defense that he acted on an emergency, that is, he had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid colliding with a passenger jeep coming from EDSA that had overtaken another vehicle and intruded into the lane of the bus. The sudden emergency rule was enunciated by this Court in Gan v. Court of Appeals,23 thus:

[O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.

Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, motorists are mandated to drive and operate vehicles on the right side of the road or highway:

SEC. 37. Driving on right side of highway. – Unless a different course of action is required in the interest of the safety and the security of life, person or property, or because of unreasonable difficulty of operation in compliance herewith, every person operating a motor vehicle or an animal-drawn vehicle on a highway shall pass to the right when meeting persons or vehicles coming toward him, and to the left when overtaking persons or vehicles going the same direction, and when turning to the left in going from one highway to another, every vehicle shall be conducted to the right of the center of the intersection of the highway.

Section 35 of the law provides, thus:

Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed.—(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.

In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code provides that "unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent, if at the time of mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation." By his own admission, petitioner Suelto violated the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when he suddenly swerved the bus to the right, thereby causing damage to the property of private respondent.

However, the trial court correctly rejected petitioner Suelto’s defense, in light of his contradictory testimony vis-à-vis his Counter-Affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation:

It is clear from the photographs submitted by the prosecution (Exhs. C, D, G, H & I) that the commercial apartment of Dr. Valdellon sustained heavy damage caused by the bus being driven by Suelto. "It seems highly improbable that the said damages were not caused by a strong impact. And, it is quite reasonable to conclude that, at the time of the impact, the bus was traveling at a high speed when Suelto tried to avoid the passenger jeepney." Such a conclusion finds support in the decision of the Supreme Court in People vs. Ison, 173 SCRA 118, where the Court stated that "physical evidence is of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses." The pictures submitted do not lie, having been taken immediately after the incident. The damages could not have been caused except by a speeding bus. Had the accused not been speeding, he could have easily reduced his speed and come to a full stop when he noticed the jeep. Were he more prudent in driving, he could have avoided the incident or even if he could not avoid the incident, the damages would have been less severe.

In addition to this, the accused has made conflicting statements in his counter-affidavit and his testimony in court. In the former, he stated that the reason why he swerved to the right was because he wanted to avoid the passenger jeepney in front of him that made a sudden stop. But, in his testimony in court, he said that it was to avoid a passenger jeepney coming from EDSA that was overtaking by occupying his lane. Such glaring inconsistencies on material points render the testimony of the witness doubtful and shatter his credibility. Furthermore, the variance between testimony and prior statements renders the witness unreliable. Such inconsistency results in the loss in the credibility of the witness and his testimony as to his prudence and diligence.

As already maintained and concluded, the severe damages sustained could not have resulted had the accused acted as a reasonable and prudent man would. The accused was not diligent as he claims to be. What is more probable is that the accused had to swerve to the right and hit the commercial apartment of the plaintiff because he could not make a full stop as he was driving too fast in a usually crowded street.

Moreover, if the claim of petitioners were true, they should have filed a third-party complaint against the driver of the offending passenger jeepney and the owner/operator thereof.

Petitioner Suelto’s reliance on the sudden emergency rule to escape conviction for the crime charged and his civil liabilities based thereon is, thus, futile.

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Philippine Charter Insurance Corp. vs. Unknown Owner

PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. UNKNOWN OWNER OF THE VESSEL M/V “NATIONAL HONOR,” NATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER SERVICES, INC.
[G.R. No. 161833. July 8, 2005]

FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation (PCIC) is the insurer of a shipment on board the vessel M/V “National Honor,” represented in the Philippines by its agent, National Shipping Corporation of the Philippines (NSCP).

The M/V “National Honor” arrived at the Manila International Container Terminal (MICT). The International Container Terminal Services, Incorporated (ICTSI) was furnished with a copy of the crate cargo list and bill of lading, and it knew the contents of the crate. The following day, the vessel started discharging its cargoes using its winch crane. The crane was operated by Olegario Balsa, a winchman from the ICTSI, exclusive arrastre operator of MICT.

Denasto Dauz, Jr., the checker-inspector of the NSCP, along with the crew and the surveyor of the ICTSI, conducted an inspection of the cargo. They inspected the hatches, checked the cargo and found it in apparent good condition. Claudio Cansino, the stevedore of the ICTSI, placed two sling cables on each end of Crate No. 1. No sling cable was fastened on the mid-portion of the crate. In Dauz’s experience, this was a normal procedure. As the crate was being hoisted from the vessel’s hatch, the mid-portion of the wooden flooring suddenly snapped in the air, about five feet high from the vessel’s twin deck, sending all its contents crashing down hard, resulting in extensive damage to the shipment.

PCIC paid the damage, and as subrogee, filed a case against M/V National Honor, NSCP and ICTSI. Both RTC and CA dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the presumption of negligence is applicable in the instant case.

HELD:
No.
We agree with the contention of the petitioner that common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are mandated to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. he Court has defined extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods as follows:

The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage to, or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for sale, carriage and delivery. It requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and “to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including such methods as their nature requires.”

The common carrier’s duty to observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of goods lasts from the time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of a reasonable time for their acceptance, by the person entitled to receive them.] >When the goods shipped are either lost or arrive in damaged condition, a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence, and there need not be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable. To overcome the presumption of negligence in the case of loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods, the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence.

However, under Article 1734 of the New Civil Code, the presumption of negligence does not apply to any of the following causes:

1. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity;
2. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
3. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
4. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
5. Order or act of competent public authority.

It bears stressing that the enumeration in Article 1734 of the New Civil Code which exempts the common carrier for the loss or damage to the cargo is a closed list. To exculpate itself from liability for the loss/damage to the cargo under any of the causes, the common carrier is burdened to prove any of the aforecited causes claimed by it by a preponderance of evidence. If the carrier succeeds, the burden of evidence is shifted to the shipper to prove that the carrier is negligent.

“Defect” is the want or absence of something necessary for completeness or perfection; a lack or absence of something essential to completeness; a deficiency in something essential to the proper use for the purpose for which a thing is to be used. On the other hand, inferior means of poor quality, mediocre, or second rate. A thing may be of inferior quality but not necessarily defective. In other words, “defectiveness” is not synonymous with “inferiority.”

x x x

In the present case, the trial court declared that based on the record, the loss of the shipment was caused by the negligence of the petitioner as the shipper:

The same may be said with respect to defendant ICTSI. The breakage and collapse of Crate No. 1 and the total destruction of its contents were not imputable to any fault or negligence on the part of said defendant in handling the unloading of the cargoes from the carrying vessel, but was due solely to the inherent defect and weakness of the materials used in the fabrication of said crate.

The crate should have three solid and strong wooden batten placed side by side underneath or on the flooring of the crate to support the weight of its contents. x x x

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Cargolift vs. Acuario

CARGOLIFT SHIPPING, INC. vs. L. ACUARIO MARKETING CORP. and SKYLAND BROKERAGE, INC
G.R. No. 146426. June 27, 2006

FACTS:
Respondent L. Acuario Marketing Corp., ("Acuario") and respondent Skyland Brokerage, Inc., ("Skyland") entered into a time charter agreement whereby Acuario leased to Skyland its L. Acuario II barge for use by the latter in transporting electrical posts from Manila to Limay, Bataan. At the same time, Skyland also entered into a separate contract with petitioner Cargolift, for the latter’s tugboats to tow the aforesaid barge.

After the whole operation was concluded, the barge was brought to Acuario’s shipyard where it was allegedly discovered by that the barge was listing due to a leak in its hull. It was informed by the skipper of the tugboat that the damage was sustained in Bataan. It was learned later the due to strong winds and large waves, the barge repeatedly hit its hull on the wall, thus prompting the barge patron to alert the tugboat captain of the M/T Count to tow the barge farther out to sea. However, the tugboat failed to pull the barge to a safer distance due to engine malfunction, thereby causing the barge to sustain a hole in its hull.

Acuario spent the total sum of P97,021.20 for the repairs, and, pursuant to the contract, sought reimbursement from Skyland, failing which, it filed a suit before the RTC which was granted. On appeal, it was affirmed by the CA. Skyland, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner alleging that it was responsible for the damage sustained by the barge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be held liable.

HELD:
Yes.
Thus, in the performance of its contractual obligation to Skyland, petitioner was required to observe the due diligence of a good father of the family. This much was held in the old but still relevant case of Baer Senior & Co.’s Successors v. La Compania Maritima where the Court explained that a tug and its owners must observe ordinary diligence in the performance of its obligation under a contract of towage. The negligence of the obligor in the performance of the obligation renders him liable for damages for the resulting loss suffered by the obligee. Fault or negligence of the obligor consists in his failure to exercise due care and prudence in the performance of the obligation as the nature of the obligation so demands.

In the case at bar, the exercise of ordinary prudence by petitioner means ensuring that its tugboat is free of mechanical problems. While adverse weather has always been a real threat to maritime commerce, the least that petitioner could have done was to ensure that the M/T Count or any of its other tugboats would be able to secure the barge at all times during the engagement. This is especially true when considered with the fact that Acuario’s barge was wholly dependent upon petitioner’s tugboat for propulsion. The barge was not equipped with any engine and needed a tugboat for maneuvering.

Needless to say, if petitioner only subjected the M/T Count to a more rigid check-up or inspection, the engine malfunction could have been discovered or avoided. The M/T Count was exclusively controlled by petitioner and the latter had the duty to see to it that the tugboat was in good running condition. There is simply no basis for petitioner’s assertion that Skyland contractually assumed the risk of any engine trouble that the tugboat may encounter. Skyland merely procured petitioner’s towing service but in no way assumed any such risk.

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Poliand Industrial Ltd vs. National Development Co. (NDC)

POLIAND INDUSTRIAL LIMITED vs. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES [G.R. No. 143866. August 22, 2005]

FACTS:
Poliand is an assignee of the of the rights of Asian Hardwood over the outstanding obligation of National Development Corporation (NDC), the latter being the owner of Galleon which previously secured credit accommodations from Asian Hardwood for its expenses on provisions, oil, repair, among others.

Galleon also obtained loans from Japanese lenders to finance acquisition of vessels which was guaranteed by DBP in consideration of a promise by Galleon to secure a first mortgage on the vessels. DBP later transferred ownership of the vessel to NDC.

A collection suit was filed after repeated demands of Poliand for the satisfaction of the obligation from Galleon, NDC and DBP went unheeded.

ISSUE: Whether POLIAND has a maritime lien enforceable against NDC or DBP or both.

HELD:
Yes, Poliand has a maritime lien which is more superior than DBP’s mortgage lien.

“Before POLIAND’s claim may be classified as superior to the mortgage constituted on the vessel, it must be shown to be one of the enumerated claims which Section 17, P.D. No. 1521 declares as having preferential status in the event of the sale of the vessel. One of such claims enumerated under Section 17, P.D. No. 1521 which is considered to be superior to the preferred mortgage lien is a maritime lien arising prior in time to the recording of the preferred mortgage. Such maritime lien is described under Section 21, P.D. No. 1521, which reads:

SECTION 21. Maritime Lien for Necessaries; persons entitled to such lien. — Any person furnishing repairs, supplies, towage, use of dry dock or marine railway, or other necessaries to any vessel, whether foreign or domestic, upon the order of the owner of such vessel, or of a person authorized by the owner, shall have a maritime lien on the vessel, which may be enforced by suit in rem, and it shall be necessary to allege or prove that credit was given to the vessel.

Under the aforequoted provision, the expense must be incurred upon the order of the owner of the vessel or its authorized person and prior to the recording of the ship mortgage. Under the law, it must be established that the credit was extended to the vessel itself.

The trial court found that GALLEON’s advances obtained from Asian Hardwood were used to cover for the payment of bunker oil/fuel, unused stores and oil, bonded stores, provisions, and repair and docking of the GALLEON vessels. These expenses clearly fall under Section 21, P.D. No. 1521.

The trial court also found that the advances from Asian Hardwood were spent for ship modification cost and the crew’s salary and wages. DBP contends that a ship modification cost is omitted under Section 17, P.D. No. 1521, hence, it does not have a status superior to DBP’s preferred mortgage lien.

As stated in Section 21, P.D. No. 1521, a maritime lien may consist in “other necessaries spent for the vessel.” The ship modification cost may properly be classified under this broad category because it was a necessary expenses for the vessel’s navigation. As long as an expense on the vessel is indispensable to the maintenance and navigation of the vessel, it may properly be treated as a maritime lien for necessaries under Section 21, P.D. No. 1521."

However, Only NDC is liable on the maritime lien

x x x [O]nly NDC is liable for the payment of the maritime lien. A maritime lien is akin to a mortgage lien in that in spite of the transfer of ownership, the lien is not extinguished. The maritime lien is inseparable from the vessel and until discharged, it follows the vessel. Hence, the enforcement of a maritime lien is in the nature and character of a proceeding quasi in rem.[65] The expression “action in rem” is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based.[66] Considering that DBP subsequently transferred ownership of the vessels to NDC, the Court holds the latter liable on the maritime lien. Notwithstanding the subsequent transfer of the vessels to NDC, the maritime lien subsists.

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): J.G. Summit Holdings vs. CA

JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION, ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST and PHILYARDS HOLDINGS G.R. No. 124293. November 20, 2000

FACTS:
National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC) and Kawasaki Heavy Industries entered into a Joint Venture Agreement in a shipyard business named PHILSECO, with a shareholding of 60-40 respectively. NIDC’s interest was later transferred to the National Government.

Pursuant to President Aquino’s Proclamation No.5, which established the Committee on Privatization (COP) and Asset Privatization Trust (APT), and allowed for the disposition of the government’s non-performing assets, the latter allowed Kawasaki Heavy Industries to choose a company to which it has stockholdings, to top the winning bid of JG Summit Holdings over PHILSECO. JG Summit protested alleging that such act would effectively increase Kawasaki’s interest in PHILSECO—a shipyard is a public utility--and thus violative of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents’ act is valid.

HELD:
No.
A shipyard such as PHILSECO being a public utility as provided by law, the following provision of the Article XII of the Constitution applies:

“Sec. 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association shall be citizens of the Philippines.”
x x x

Notably, paragraph 1.4 of the JVA accorded the parties the right of first refusal “under the same terms.” This phrase implies that when either party exercises the right of first refusal under paragraph 1.4, they can only do so to the extent allowed them by paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of the JVA or under the proportion of 60%-40% of the shares of stock. Thus, should the NIDC opt to sell its shares of stock to a third party, Kawasaki could only exercise its right of first refusal to the extent that its total shares of stock would not exceed 40% of the entire shares of stock of SNS or PHILSECO. The NIDC, on the other hand, may purchase even beyond 60% of the total shares. As a government corporation and necessarily a 100% Filipino-owned corporation, there is nothing to prevent its purchase of stocks even beyond 60% of the capitalization as the Constitution clearly limits only foreign capitalization.

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): C.B. Williams vs. Yangco

C. B. WILLIAMS vs. TEODORO R. YANGCO
G.R. No. L-8325. March 10, 1914

FACTS:
The steamer Subic, owned by the defendant, collided with the lunch Euclid owned by the plaintiff, in the Bay of Manila at an early hour on the morning of January 9, 1911, and the Euclid sank five minutes thereafter. This action was brought to recover the value of the Euclid.

The court below held from the evidence submitted that the Euclid was worth at a fair valuation P10,000; that both vessels were responsible for the collision; and that the loss should be divided equally between the respective owners, P5,000 to be paid the plaintiff by the defendant, and P5,000 to be borne by the plaintiff himself. From this judgment both defendant and plaintiff appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff should not be held liable on account of doctrine of last clear chance—the defendant having the last opportunity to avoid the collision.

HELD:
No.
In cases of a disaster arising from the mutual negligence of two parties, the party who has a last clear opportunity of avoiding the accident, notwithstanding the negligence of his opponent, is considered wholly responsible for it under the common-law rule of liability as applied in the courts of common law of the United States. But this rule (which is not recognized in the courts of admiralty in the United States, wherein the loss is divided in cases of mutual and concurring negligence, as also where the error of one vessel has exposed her to danger of collision which was consummated by he further rule, that where the previous application by the further rule, that where the previous act of negligence of one vessel has created a position of danger, the other vessel is not necessarily liable for the mere failure to recognize the perilous situation; and it is only when in fact it does discover it in time to avoid the casualty by the use of ordinary care, that it becomes liable for the failure to make use of this last clear opportunity to avoid the accident. (See cases cited in Notes, 7 Cyc., pp. 311, 312, 313.) So, under the English rule which conforms very nearly to the common-law rule as applied in the American courts, it has been held that the fault of the first vessel in failing to exhibit proper lights or to take the proper side of the channel will relieve from liability one who negligently runs into such vessels before he sees it; although it will not be a defense to one who, having timely warning of the danger of collision, fails to use proper care to avoid it. (Pollock on Torts, 374.). In the case at bar, the most that can be said in support of plaintiff's contention is that there was negligence on the part of the officers on defendant's vessel in failing to recognize the perilous situation created by the negligence of those in charge of plaintiff's launch, and that had they recognized it in time, they might have avoided the accident. But since it does not appear from the evidence that they did, in fact, discover the perilous situation of the launch in time to avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary care, it is very clear that under the above set out limitation to the rule, the plaintiff cannot escape the legal consequences of the contributory negligence of his launch, even were we to hold that the doctrine is applicable in the jurisdiction, upon which point we expressly reserve our decision at this time.

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Monarch Insurance Co., Inc. vs. CA

MONARCH INSURANCE CO., INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 92735. June 8, 2000

FACTS:
Monarch and Tabacalera are insurance carriers of lost cargoes. They indemnified the shippers and were consequently subrogated to their rights, interests and actions against Aboitiz, the cargo carrier. Because Aboitiz refused to compensate Monarch, it filed two complaints against Aboitiz which were consolidated and jointly tried.

Aboitiz rejected responsibility for the claims on the ground that the sinking of its cargo vessel was due to force majeure or an act of God. Aboitiz was subsequently declared as in default and allowed Monarch and Tabacalera to present evidence ex-parte.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of limited liability applies in the instant case.

HELD:
Yes.
The failure of Aboitiz to present sufficient evidence to exculpate itself from fault and/or negligence in the sinking of its vessel in the face of the foregoing expert testimony constrains us to hold that Aboitiz was concurrently at fault and/or negligent with the ship captain and crew of the M/V P. Aboitiz. [This is in accordance with the rule that in cases involving the limited liability of shipowners, the initial burden of proof of negligence or unseaworthiness rests on the claimants. However, once the vessel owner or any party asserts the right to limit its liability, the burden of proof as to lack of privity or knowledge on its part with respect to the matter of negligence or unseaworthiness is shifted to it. This burden, Aboitiz had unfortunately failed to discharge.] That Aboitiz failed to discharge the burden of proving that the unseaworthiness of its vessel was not due to its fault and/or negligence should not however mean that the limited liability rule will not be applied to the present cases. The peculiar circumstances here demand that there should be no strict adherence to procedural rules on evidence lest the just claims of shippers/insurers be frustrated. The rule on limited liability should be applied in accordance with the latest ruling in Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, Ltd.,] promulgated on January 21, 1993, that claimants be treated as "creditors in an insolvent corporation whose assets are not enough to satisfy the totality of claims against it."

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Aboitiz Shipping Corp. vs. New India Assurance Co., Ltd

ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD G..R. No. 156978 May 2, 2006

FACTS:
Societe Francaise Des Colloides loaded a cargo of textiles and auxiliary chemicals from France on board a vessel owned by Franco-Belgian Services, Inc. The cargo was consigned to General Textile, Inc., in Manila and insured by respondent New India Assurance Company, Ltd. While in Hong Kong, the cargo was transferred to M/V P. Aboitiz for transshipment to Manila.

Before departing, the vessel was advised by the Japanese Meteorological Center that it was safe to travel to its destination. But while at sea, the vessel received a report of a typhoon moving within its general path. To avoid the typhoon, the vessel changed its course. However, it was still at the fringe of the typhoon when its hull leaked. On October 31, 1980, the vessel sank, but the captain and his crew were saved.

Both the trial and the appellate courts found that the sinking was not due to the typhoon but to its unseaworthiness.

ISSUE:
Whether the limited liability doctrine, which limits respondent’s award of damages to its pro-rata share in the insurance proceeds, applies in this case.

HELD:
No. x x x An exception to the limited liability doctrine is when the damage is due to the fault of the shipowner or to the concurrent negligence of the shipowner and the captain. In which case, the shipowner shall be liable to the full-extent of the damage.

x x x

In the present case, petitioner has the burden of showing that it exercised extraordinary diligence in the transport of the goods it had on board in order to invoke the limited liability doctrine. Differently put, to limit its liability to the amount of the insurance proceeds, petitioner has the burden of proving that the unseaworthiness of its vessel was not due to its fault or negligence. Considering the evidence presented and the circumstances obtaining in this case, we find that
petitioner failed to discharge this burden. It initially attributed the sinking to the typhoon and relied on the BMI findings that it was not at fault. However, both the trial and the appellate courts, in this case, found that the sinking was not due to the typhoon but to its unseaworthiness. Evidence on record showed that the weather was moderate when the vessel sank. These factual findings of the Court of Appeals, affirming those of the trial court are not to be disturbed on appeal, but must be accorded great weight. These findings are conclusive not only on the parties but on this Court as well.

Case Digest in Evidence (Remedial Law): Silot vs. De la Rosa

GREGORIO SILOT, JR. vs. ESTRELLA DE LA ROSA

[G.R. No. 159240. February 4, 2008]

FACTS:
Petitioner Silot and respondent de la Rosa entered into a contract for the construction of a dormitory-apartment building. They expressly agreed that Silot shall supply the labor and de la Rosa shall pay 33% of the total value of the materials purchased for the project. Upon turnover of the completed structure, the total cost of materials actually purchased was P2,504,469.65, 33% of which is P826,474.98. Silot required de la Rosa to pay a total of P1,018,000.00, or P191,525.02 more than the amount due. Through her son-in-law, de la Rosa confronted Silot about the overpayment but the latter refused to return the overpayment. After her repeated demands fell on deaf ears, de la Rosa filed a suit against Silot. Silot, in retaliation, sued de la Rosa for insufficient payment, claiming that he was supposed to receive P1,281,872.404 but was only paid P1,008,000.00, thus still leaving a balance of P273,872.40.

During trial, however, Atty. San Jose, counsel for Silot, dispensed with the testimony of Ariel Goingo, a witness for de la Rosa. Atty. San Jose admitted Goingo's proposed testimony to the effect that in consideration of the 33% as mentioned in the contract, all the material supplies during the making of the additional works mentioned were already accounted for; that Silot was paid for all works that were performed as well as all materials supplied; that the total sum was P2,504,469.65, so that 33% of which is only P826,474.98; that de la Rosa paid the amount of P1,018,000.00; hence, there was an excess payment of P191,525.02; and that de la Rosa never received any demand from nor was she confronted by Silot regarding an alleged balance.

Consequently, after trial, the RTC ruled in favor of de la Rosa and ordered Silot to return the overpaid amount. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:
Whether the admission by Atty. San Jose, counsel of petitioner Silot, constituted judicial admission of respondent's evidence.

HELD:
Yes.
Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that the client is bound by the mistakes arising from negligence of his own counsel. The only exception to this rule is, as the Court of Appeals itself cited in its decision, when the negligence is so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court.

In our considered view, however, that exception does not find any application in this case. As the records would plainly show, Silot was not deprived of his day in court. Also, as the appellate court observed, he could have introduced evidence, testimonial or otherwise, in order to controvert or correct the admission made by his counsel. Said the appellate court:

…As gleaned from the records, defendant-appellant Silot was not deprived of his day in court. He was given every opportunity to be heard through his pleadings and manifestations. He was also presented in open court to testify. As quoted earlier, Atty. Terbio, counsel for plaintiff-appellee de la Rosa, even repeatedly asked Atty. San Jose, defendant-appellant Silot's counsel, if he would admit the purpose for which the witness Ariel Goingo will testify to dispense with his testimony, and Atty. San Jose repeatedly answered that "We will admit that." And when asked by the judge if he will admit it, he answered that they will admit P2,504,000.00.

More importantly, Silot's counsel clearly made admissions of the content of the testimony of witness Goingo, whose presentation was dispensed with. In People v. Hernandez, we held that admissions made for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some facts are in the nature of judicial admissions, to wit:

A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial in open court is automatically reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused in the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: "[…] an attorney who is employed to manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit […] has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, […] which unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive." (Italics supplied.) In fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made […] for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, […] they bind the client, whether made during, or even after, the trial.

Worth stressing, in this connection, judicial admissions do not require proof and may not be contradicted in the absence of a prior showing that the admissions had been made through palpable mistake.

Furthermore, in the case of Toh v. Court of Appeals, this Court emphasized the consequence of admitting and dispensing with the testimony of the proposed witness, thus:


The Court sees no cogent reason why the said witness should be examined any further since his testimony as summarized in the offer made by counsel was expressly admitted by opposing counsel. With the said admission, the testimony of said witness is uncontroverted and even admitted as fact by opposing counsel.…

Case Digest in Evidence (Remedial Law): Cuenco vs. Talisay Tourist Sports Complex, Inc.

JESUS CUENCO vs. TALISAY TOURIST SPORTS COMPLEX, INC. and MATIAS B. AZNAR III

[G.R. No. 174154, October 17, 2008]

FACTS:
Petitioner leased from respondent a property to be operated as a cockpit. Upon expiration of the contract, respondent company conducted a public bidding for the lease of the property. Petitioner participated in the bidding. The lease was eventually awarded to another bidder. Thereafter, petitioner formally demanded, through several demand letters, for the return of his deposit in the sum of P500, 000.00. It, however, all remained unheeded.

Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money maintaining that respondents acted in bad faith in withholding the amount of the deposit without any justifiable reason. In their Answer, respondents countered that petitioner caused physical damage to the leased premises and the cost of repair and replacement of materials amounted to more than P500,000.00.

The RTC issued a Pre-trial Order in which respondent admitted that there is no inventory of damages. The respondents later offered an inventory which was admitted by the said trial court. The RTC ruled favorably for the petitioner. The CA reversed said decision.

ISSUES:
Whether a judicial admission is conclusive and binding upon a party making the admission.

HELD:
Yes.
Obviously, it was on Coronado's testimony, as well as on the documentary evidence of an alleged property inventory conducted on June 4, 1998, that the CA based its conclusion that the amount of damage sustained by the leased premises while in the possession of petitioner exceeded the amount of petitioner's deposit. This contradicts the judicial admission made by respondents' counsel which should have been binding on the respondents.

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the pleadings, (2) during the trial, by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (3) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. The stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial admissions. The veracity of judicial admissions require no further proof and may be controverted only upon a clear showing that the admissions were made through palpable mistake or that no admissions were made. Thus, the admissions of parties during the pre-trial, as embodied in the pre-trial order, are binding and conclusive upon them.

Respondents did not deny the admission made by their counsel, neither did they claim that the same was made through palpable mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts is incontrovertible and may be relied upon by the courts. The pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt therein may not be brushed aside in the process of decision-making. Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pre-trial would be rendered inconsequential and worthless. Furthermore, an act performed by counsel within the scope of a "general or implied authority" is
regarded as an act of the client which renders respondents in estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an admission or representation is conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.

Thus, respondents are bound by the admissions made by their counsel at the pre-trial. Accordingly, the CA committed an error when it gave ample evidentiary weight to respondents' evidence contradictory to the judicial admission.

SC flip-flops again, rules laws creating 16 cities constitutional

By Tetch Torres INQUIRER.net
First Posted 17:23:00 02/16/2011

MANILA, Philippines— For the third time, the Supreme Court on Wednesday flip-flopped on its decision as it again reversed its August 2010 ruling that declared as unconstitutional the cityhood laws or Republic Acts converting 16 municipalities into cities.

In the ruling penned by Associate Justice Lucas Bersamin, the high court reverted to its December 2009 decision declaring as constitutional the cityhood laws that converted the 16 cities into municipalities.

“This is a very unusual case considering that the court issued four decisions on this,” high court spokesman Jose Midas Marquez said referring to the November 2008, December 2009, August 2010 and Wednesday’s ruling.

Marquez attributed the changes in the decision to the composition of the Supreme Court noting that some justices who were part of the November 2008 deliberation have already retired.

“A change in the composition (of the high court) can influence the outcome of the case,” Marquez said.

Declared as constitutional were RA Nos. 9389 (creating Baybay City in Leyte), 9390 (Bogo City in Cebu), 9391 (Catbalogan City in Samar), 9392 (Tandag City in Surigao del Sur), 9393 (Lamitan City in Basilan), 9394 (Borongan City in Samar), 9398 (Tayabas City in Quezon), 9404 (Tabuk City in Kalinga), 9405 (Bayugan City in Agusan del Sur), 9407 (Batac City in Ilocos Norte), 9408 (Mati City in Davao Oriental), 9409 (Guihulngan City in Negros Oriental), 9434 (Cabadbaran City in Agusan del Norte), 9435 (El Salvador City in Misamis Oriental), 9436 (Carcar City in Cebu), and 9491 (Naga City in Cebu).

On Nov. 18, 2008, the high court nullified the 16 cityhood laws for violating the Constitution. The decision became final after the high court denied its first motion for reconsideration while a divided high court with a vote of 6-6 denied the second appeal. Then, on May 21, 2009, the high court said it would no longer allow any pleadings related to the case.

However, the town mayors urged the high court to resolve the second motion for reconsideration that led to a reversal of its November 2008 decision and declared the 16 laws constitutional in its December 2009 decision.

The League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) filed a motion for reconsideration asking the high court to reinstate its November 2008 decision, which it granted in a resolution issued August 2010.

Then, the town mayors appealed the August 2010 ruling which was reversed on Wednesday by the high court.


Marquez said this case was “very unusual” and that this could not be cited by other parties with pending cases with the high court because its decision is pro hac vice (for this particular occasion).

SC admonishes UP law dean, professors on plagiarism case

By Tetch Torres INQUIRER.net
First Posted 17:48:00 03/08/2011
Filed Under: Legal issues, Judiciary (system of justice)

MANILA, Philippines—The Supreme Court on Tuesday admonished University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law Dean Marvic Leonen for leading its faculty to join the call for Supreme Court Associate Justice Mariano Del Castillo to resign over the issue of plagiarism.

“UP Law Dean Marvic Leonen is admonished for setting a bad example to our law students,” high court Spokesman Jose Midas Marquez said at a press conference Tuesday at the Supreme Court’s en banc session hall.

Voting 9-5, Marquez said the high court exonerated UP law professor Raul Vasquez after he apologized before the court.

Thirty-five other professors were reminded of their duty as officers of the court. They are Froilan Bacungan, Pacifico Agabin, Merlin Magallona, Salvador Carlota, Carmelo Sison, Patricia Salvador Daway, Dante Gatmaytan, Theodore Te, Florin Hilbay, Jay Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) Battad, Gwen de Vera, Solomon Lumba, Rommel Casis, Jose Gerardo Alampay, Miguel Armovit, Arthur Autea, Rosa Maria Bautista;

Mark Bocobo, Dan Calica, Tristan Catindig, Sandra Marie Coronel, Rosario Gallo, Concepcion Jardeleza, Antonio La Viña, Carina Laforteza, Jose Laureta, Owen Lynch, Rodolfo Noel Quimbo, Antonio Santos, Gmeleen Faye Tomboc, Nicholas Felix Ty, Evalyn Ursua, Susan Villanueva and Dina Lucenario.

“The Justices found the compliance of the UP faculty unsatisfactory,” Marquez said.

The UP faculty issued a statement on Aug. 6, 2010, accusing Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo of plagiarism in a decision he wrote on a case filed by so-called comfort women.

The statement said that “the plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court.”

The high court, however, cleared Del Castillo of plagiarism. In October last year, it ordered the UP signatories to explain why administrative sanctions should not be imposed on them.

Marquez said the Supreme Court “found the compliance of the UP Faculty unsatisfactory.”

The Justices who dissented from the majority decision were Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, Associate Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Antonio Eduardo Nachura, Martin Villarama and Maria Lourdes Sereno.

Source Inquirer.net

2010 Bar Exam Results (released in 2011)

2010 Bar Examination Passers (982 out of 4,847 or 20.26 %)

The top 10 bar examinees (Topnotchers)

1. Caesario Antonio S. Singzon, Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU), 89.000
2. Filemon Ray L. Javier, ADMU, 86.850
3. Paolo Carlo C. Tolentino, Arellano University, 86.800
4. Janette R. Ancog, Ateneo de Davao University, 85.900
5. Johanna Sunga, ADMU, 85.850
6. Krizelle Marie F. Poblacion, University of the Philippines, 85.650
7. Maria Christina C. Ortua, UP, 85.50
Krystal Lyn T. Uy, UP, 85.50
8. Johanna Eileen M. Capones, UP, 84.800
9. Wiliam Benson S. Gan, ADMU, 84.750
10. Glenn C. Carampatana, University of San carlos, 84.550
Darren L. Salipsip, Arellano University, 84.550

Complete List

1. ABAD, Charmee R .

2. ABADA, Merlin I .

3. ABARIENTOS, Ma. Theresa M .

4. ABBAS, JR., Yusoph M .

5. ABELLA, Charmian Maria F .

6. ABELLA, Sheena Marie R .

7. ABIERA-MONTESA, Rosalyn B .

8. ABING, Ramil P .

9. ABONG, Mark Julio U .

10. ABRAGAN, Martin Luke G .

11. ABRAHAM, Sarah Joan M .

12. ABUBACAR, Rayhanah M .

13. ABUGAN, Herbert Calvin P .

14. ABUNDO, Judith Rowena D .

15. ABUZO, Djerovin T .

16. ABUZO, James M .

17. ACACIO, Rea Andria L .

18. ACAYAN, Moises Y .

19. ACEJO, Michael A .

20. ACUÑA, Emmanuel L .

21. ADAOAG, Maria Efelin C .

22. ADRIANO, Jasmine M .

23. ADRIATICO, Maria Clarissa N .

24. ADVINCULA, Margaux A .

25. AFIADO, Manuel Emilio B .

26. AFRICA, Marie Denise G .

27. AGA, Dennis M .

28. AGLIBOT, Ma. Katrina J .

29. AGNO, Regina Domini L .

30. AGUILA, Mary Jasmin P .

31. AGUILERA, Raymond G .

32. AGUINALDO, Ma. Angela Leonor C .

33. AGUSTIN, Paulo Francisco A .

34. AJERO, Chris A .

35. AKUT, Charissa Joy C .

36. ALADO, Patrick Vincent A .

37. ALAMIN, Lorajean A .

38. ALBARICO, Allesandra Fay V .

39. ALBERTO-ESTRELLA, Grace Irish C .

40. ALBURO, Alvin L .

41. ALCALA, Carla Diana P .

42. ALCANTARA, Rina C .

43. ALCOMENDRAS, Andrey A .

44. ALEGRADO, Julius P .

45. ALFARO, Plebiscito T .

46. ALIAS, Margarita R .

47. ALICAYA, Giancarlo T .

48. ALICO, Wendy Josephine L .

49. ALMAZAN, Gladys Joy B .

50. ALMIRANTE, JR., Eduardo Q .

51. ALONZO, Ronalin B .

52. ALVAREZ, Tyrone O .

53. ALVIOR, Marianne Carmel D .

54. ALZONA, Ivin Ronald DM.

55. AMOROSO, Dranyl Jared P .

56. AMURAO, Mark Anthony T .

57. ANCHETA, Glenn Thyron S .

58. ANCOG, Janette R .

59. ANDOY-GAWIDEN, Sol Marie P .

60. ANDRES, Ryan D .

61. ANDRES, JR., Antonio D .

62. ANG, Noel C .

63. ANGGOT, Anabelle A .

64. ANIAG, Bernard Benjamin T .

65. ANTONIO, Chantal Charisse Q .

66. APOLINAR, Jannierose O .

67. APOLINAR, Leanne Maureen S .

68. APOLINARIO, Reiner P .

69. AQUINO, Mark Christian M .

70. AQUINO, Philipe T .

71. ARANAS, Lucky Angelo T .

72. ARANDELA, Melrose R .

73. ARAO, Amador Iñigo L .

74. ARCENO, Arnold P .

75. ARCEÑO, Dee A .

76. ARDET, Arnie T .

77. ARENAS, Mark Ranier C .

78. ARNOCO, Marvey J .

79. ARQUILLO, Ma. Golda G .

80. ASDILLO, Angeline T .

81. ASENIERO, Antonio C .

82. ASILO, Kathrine Ann D .

83. ASIS, Enrico D .

84. ASIS, John Michael V .

85. ASUNCION, Amiel Victor A .

86. AUSTRIA, Katherine M .

87. AUSTRIA, Laurice Marie Angela T .

88. AVENIDO, Gian Marco F .

89. AVILA, Analyn G .

90. AZNAR, Katrina Monserrat F .

91. AZURA, Jules Emmanuel N .

92. AÑONUEVO, Leo Angelo Miguel R .

93. BABATUAN, Lei Maurae E .

94. BABON, Joanne B .

95. BABOR, Sarah Faye Q .

96. BACABAC, Candice V .

97. BACANI, Ramon Miguel E .

98. BACLAYEN, Pilipinas D .

99. BACSAL, Eric Allan E .

100. BADANDO, Artemis Q .

101. BAGAFORO, II-ARELLANO, Agnes Farida S .

102. BAGAMASPAD, Cris Lawrence A .

103. BAGO, Jayfrancis D .

104. BALAG-EY, Paul M .

105. BALAJADIA, Christine B .

106. BALALENG, Emil Rey I .

107. BALANA, Carmie A .

108. BALANAG, Kristine Gay B .

109. BALANSAY, Lorelei S .

110. BALAO, Edward Vincent P .

111. BALBASTRE, Billie Joy A .

112. BALDOZA, Limuel V .

113. BALGUA, JR., Mariano V .

114. BALISI, Reody Anthony M .

115. BALISONG, Analene V .

116. BALITA, Vanessa Juvy O .

117. BALMORES, John Paul M .

118. BALUCANAG, Suzette B .

119. BALUYUT, Cesar M .

120. BANDAL, Jason M .

121. BANDONG, Jayvee Laurence B .

122. BANGAYAN, Carrie Mae C .

123. BANTILAN, Bryan G .

124. BAQUIRAN, Joseph Lemuel B .

125. BARCENA, Johann Carlos S .

126. BARGAMENTO, Hazan F .

127. BARRAMEDA, Paul Isaac A .

128. BARRIENTOS, Marie Aileen L .

129. BATAAN, Aleah Rafel G .

130. BATALLER, Diana Elaine B .

131. BATALLONES, Gino Angelo P .

132. BATAY-AN, Rex D .

133. BAUTISTA, Carlo Antonio A .

134. BAUTISTA, Claribelle S .

135. BAUTISTA, Gilbert B .

136. BAUTISTA, Jose Javier P .

137. BAUTISTA, Melissa Ann M .

138. BAUTISTA, JR., Raymundo B .

139. BAUZA, Brian Ashley M .

140. BAYBAY, Ray-an Francis V .

141. BAÑEZ, Roselyn G .

142. BECEIRA, Rona M .

143. BEDING, Ronald Y .

144. BEJOSA, Theeza Danielle P .

145. BELCIÑA, Celeste B .

146. BELDEROL, Mary Joy P .

147. BELGICA, Marietta M .

148. BENITEZ, Lovelle B .

149. BENTULAN, Mae L .

150. BERAMO, Maria Daniaflor F .

151. BERNABE, Ericia P .

152. BERNARDO, Romina R .

153. BERNARTE, Kristine M .

154. BESOÑA, Rholie C .

155. BEÑAS, Kristine Paul B .

156. BIBANGCO, Jorlett L .

157. BISA, Myzel B .

158. BISNAR, Gerardo Alfredo M .

159. BLAS, Herbert J .

160. BONGCAWIL, Cherrie Mae J .

161. BORAIS, Charlyn D .

162. BORROMEO, Renato P .

163. BOSANTOG, Marlon P .

164. BROFAR, Reinier John G .

165. BUCIO, Erwin B .

166. BUDUHAN, Diana Grace D .

167. BUEN-MERENCILLA, Paula Michelle O .

168. BUENAVENTURA, Kathy C .

169. BUENAVENTURA, Kristoffer N .

170. BUENO, Gemicks Ace T .

171. BUENSUCESO, Sean M .

172. BUETA, Gregorio Rafael P .

173. BULAC, Michelle Mae C .

174. BULANG, Oliver C .

175. BULIYAT, Marie Mae D .

176. BUMATAY-GEMARINO, Sharon N .

177. BURKLEY, Florence Diana V .

178. BUROG, Marie Irahlyn C .

179. BUSQUE, Janice H .

180. BUSTONERA, Chito Noel D .

181. CABATINGAN, Marisar Ivy C .

182. CABE, Rodalice P .

183. CABRADILLA, Fritz M .

184. CABRERA, Stanley Kristoffer V .

185. CABUDOC, Edsel R .

186. CABUGAO, John Philip O .

187. CADAYDAY, JR., Clayton C .

188. CADLUM-BOCO, Eusebia A .

189. CAGUETE, Joan Kathlyn C .

190. CAGUIAT, Johnny DC.

191. CAGUIOA, Francis Carlos C .

192. CAHIG, Carmela Rosario C .

193. CALANGI, Amelia A .

194. CALI, Nesrin B .

195. CALIBUYOT, Gwin V .

196. CALIMAG, Maria Rizza M .

197. CALINGASAN, Christian C .

198. CALIP, Norren Joy B .

199. CALIPAYAN, Jamaal James R .

200. CALO, Ludmilia L .

201. CALSADO, Anna Carmi R .

202. CAMPOS, Rosalinda G .

203. CANCINO, Christopher M .

204. CANDA-MELODIAS, Cherry P .

205. CANO, Darwin F .

206. CANTRE, JR., Recolito Ferdinand N .

207. CAPONES, Joanna Eileen M .

208. CAPUL, Christopher P .

209. CARAMPATANA, Glenn C .

210. CARANDANG, Carlo Brian S .

211. CARLOS, Kristine Joy G .

212. CARREON, Divina N .

213. CARREON, Jerilee R .

214. CASIS, Rainier J .

215. CASIÑO, Rhett S .

216. CASPE, Ma. Jesusa D .

217. CASTILLO, Lysander N .

218. CASTILLO, Margaret V .

219. CASTRO, Premier Dee Ewigkeit C .

220. CATABAY, Criselda J .

221. CATEDRAL, Ralph Vincent G .

222. CAYMO, II, Apolinario L .

223. CELIS, Ana Katrina C .

224. CENIZA, Brian P .

225. CERCADO, Crispin Simoun P .

226. CERO, De Mille V .

227. CHAGUILE, Adryan B .

228. CHERREGUINE, Clarence G .

229. CHING, Margaret R .

230. CHING, Princess Bambi B .

231. CHOTRANI, Dolly J .

232. CHUA, Germaine L .

233. CHUA, Katrina Pearl C .

234. CHUA-ASIS, Maria Aileen R .

235. CHUA-CHAM, Rosita

236. CHUNG, Jae Woo

237. CIUDADANO, Gil Norman D .

238. CLARAVALL, Benedicto Bienvenido C .

239. CO, Joan Kristel C .

240. CO, Zsa Zsa Lae K .

241. CODERA, Jandy P .

242. COLOMA, Janice G .

243. COLONIA, Chito John J .

244. COLOYAN, Sigrid Smile P .

245. COMIA, Frankie E .

246. CONCEPCION, Aleli U .

247. CONCEPCION, Anthony Chadd R .

248. CONDE, Bethany V .

249. CONOS, JR., Servillano A .

250. CONSTANTINO, Jeffrey B .

251. CORPUS, Ponciano Dexter Hector S .

252. CORTEZ, Deneesse Lou T .

253. CORTEZ, II, Jose Charito I .

254. COSALAN, Katarina Gabrielle V .

255. CRUZ, Eric C .

256. CRUZ, Jonas C .

257. CRUZ, Nicolette Ann P .

258. CRUZ, Ria Carmela R .

259. CRUZ, Trisha Andrea G .

260. CRUZ, Vincent Patrick R .

261. CUADRA-ROBINTA, Madyll S .

262. CUANAN, JR., Edgard B .

263. CUARTERO, Mary Anne C .

264. CUERPO, Von Bryan C .

265. CUIZON, Jasmine L .

266. CURADA, Alvin B .

267. CUTARAN-CONTACTO, Yvette F .

268. DADULA, Joel B .

269. DALAGAN, Maria Romina M .

270. DALAUIDAO, Jan Michael U .

271. DALIVA, JR., Anacleto I .

272. DARVIN, Daniel Nicholas C .

273. DATO-ABUEL, Juanita Lilet A .

274. DAVID, Melba A .

275. DAVIS, Herbert C .

276. DE ALBAN, Ma. Caren Gail M .

277. DE CASTRO-BAQUIRAN, Cristine A .

278. DE CHAVEZ, Maricel L .

279. DE GUZMAN, Adrian T .

280. DE GUZMAN, Angela T .

281. DE GUZMAN, Ria Flor C .

282. DE LA CRUZ, Paul Vincent G .

283. DE LA CRUZ-JAVIER, Sheba V .

284. DE LEON, Carlos Rafael G .

285. DE LEON, Ian Jerny E .

286. DE VERA, Reagan S .

287. DEAÑO, Carmelita D .

288. DEIPARINE, Sydrick Jose Andrei G .

289. DEL BARRIO-ALCANSE, Franchesca L .

290. DEL CAMPO, Charisse Kay J .

291. DEL ROSARIO, Jerome F .

292. DEL ROSARIO, Powell A .

293. DEL ROSARIO, Richard M .

294. DEL VALLE, Irish Kay J .

295. DELA CRUZ, Ramon Alfredo E .

296. DELA CRUZ, JR., Cresencio D .

297. DELA PEÑA, Plen John Mark M .

298. DELOSO, Izelle Iamly P .

299. DENSING, Teresita A .

300. DIAZ, Robelita B .

301. DIGAUM, Ma. Zusabel R .

302. DIMAANO, Mae Belle D .

303. DIMAANO, Manuel M .

304. DIMARUCUT, Bernadette C .

305. DIONISIO, Emmylou M .

306. DIONISIO, Lorenze Angelo G .

307. DIZON-VICTORIO, Cristy B .

308. DOCENA, Melinda L .

309. DOCTOR, Brenn A .

310. DOLENDO, Arvin C .

311. DOLON, Nadine B .

312. DOMASIAN, Evan E .

313. DOMINGO, Jennifer V .

314. DONALVO, Percy Valsan Jun P .

315. DONATO, James Daniel S .

316. DUGASAN, Ann Kilsa M .

317. DULHAO, Mary Joan M .

318. DULLA, Maria Estrella G .

319. DULLANO, Phoebe Lou B .

320. DUMALE, Eraño A .

321. DUMDUM, Genevieve T .

322. DUMLAO, Nadine U .

323. DUÑGO, Carl Derick C .

324. DUÑOS, Lory Jean G .

325. EDQUILAG, Michael R .

326. EGAY, Aimee Faith L .

327. ELEAZAR, Norguel Yazer M .

328. ELMACO, Lloyd Jeson L .

329. EMATA, Sheila Marie P .

330. EMRALINO, Maria Virginia P .

331. ENCONADO, Aman Y .

332. ENDICO, Marricar C .

333. ENDRENAL, Anthony L .

334. ENDRINO-FRANCISCO, Florida L .

335. ENRIQUEZ, Kristie Auriel T .

336. EPONDULAN, Yvonne A .

337. ESCALANTE, Daisy L .

338. ESMAN, Persel G .

339. ESPEDIDO, Spence V .

340. ESPINA, Julius A .

341. ESPONILLA, Ryan P .

342. ESTANISLAO, JR., Rizalino C .

343. ESTRADA, Lea S .

344. ESTRELLA, Anatoly N .

345. EVANGELISTA, Edmon B .

346. EVARDONE, Pearl Fatima L .

347. FABELLON, Katherina S .

348. FABIAN, Jocelyn T .

349. FABROS, Ari Vergil P .

350. FACULANAN, Jefferson T .

351. FACUN, Ramon D .

352. FELICIANO, Joseph Dexter M .

353. FERMO, Augusto P .

354. FERNANDEZ, Jamara Leigh C .

355. FERNANDEZ, John Dennis C .

356. FERNANDEZ, Joseph Christopher Y .

357. FERNANDEZ, March Jefferson M .

358. FERNIZ, Betsie A .

359. FEROLIN, Perr R .

360. FERRER, Kristine R .

361. FERRER, Sherwin C .

362. FLORES, Lyra Miragrace C .

363. FLORES, Reynaldo L .

364. FORTES, Gladys A .

365. FRANCISCO-LAO, Katrina Marie C .

366. FUYONAN, Milanie M .

367. GAANAN, JR., Eduardo Cezar D .

368. GABRIEL, Golda May D .

369. GAERLAN, Rosette S .

370. GALAN, Rene Rose DS.

371. GALIDO, Jeffrey P .

372. GALLEGA, Francis Avelyn B .

373. GALLEGO, Rhonalyn C .

374. GALLENERO, Sharmen D .

375. GAN, William Benson S .

376. GANDILLO, Alpha Faith A .

377. GARCIA, Aristeo Franklin M .

378. GARCIA, Enrico C .

379. GARCIA, Radney R .

380. GARCIA, Richard V .

381. GASPAR, Jervis A .

382. GATDULA, Isser Josef V .

383. GATMAITAN, Camille Bianca M .

384. GEMELO, Therese Xyza D .

385. GEMENTIZA, JR., Diosdado N .

386. GENDRANO, Jose Federico M .

387. GENERAL, Reuben Carlo O .

388. GENEROSO, Analie L .

389. GENIO, Jill Julie V .

390. GERALDEZ, Gia Angeli R .

391. GIALOGO, Edward G .

392. GO, Aldwill T .

393. GO, Eunice C .

394. GO, Gracyl Criste D .

395. GO, Lauren Niña A .

396. GO, Mary Jane L .

397. GO, Natasha M .

398. GOLOSINO, June Marianne E .

399. GOMEZ, Diana G .

400. GONZAGA, Rey Daniel N .

401. GONZALES, Geepee A .

402. GONZALES, Genevieve N .

403. GONZALES, Jose Paulo G .

404. GONZALES, Marvey Jay A .

405. GONZALES, Tristram E .

406. GONZALES-AGUINALDO, Melissa R .

407. GONZALES-DARADAL, Abigail M .

408. GORRA, Jypsie Rose M .

409. GRANDE, Joanalyn A .

410. GUADES, Jose Crisostomo Y .

411. GUARIN, Rudolph Val F .

412. GUEVARRA, Loralee Suzette A .

413. GULTIANO, Eudisan P .

414. GUMABUN, Leonardo Nick D .

415. GUTIERREZ, Margarita N .

416. GUTOC, Abraham A .

417. HALLARES, John Fred C .

418. HAUTEA, Kathryn Joy Q .

419. HAW, Charmaine Rose K .

420. HERNANDEZ, Ana Lynn O .

421. HERNANDEZ, Dave John T .

422. HERNANDEZ, Jeffrey C .

423. HERNANDEZ, Maria Rowena P .

424. HERRIN, Mark Andrew C .

425. HO, Aaron Jarveen O .

426. HO, Charlie L .

427. HOSAKA, Jenicka Elizabeth E .

428. HUMANGIT, Maria Carmen Hazel N .

429. IBARRA, Marvin B .

430. IFURUNG, Nina Diorella K .

431. IFURUNG, Viralysa E .

432. ILAGAN, Rowell D .

433. ILEDAN, Jerald I .

434. ILO, Cecille Marie D .

435. ILUSTRISIMO, Vanessa L .

436. INFANTE, Maria Katrina L .

437. INTERINO, Honey Lyn B .

438. ISON, Jayson Jay P .

439. ITCHON, Reyna Fe C .

440. JABINES, III, Arturo B .

441. JACINTO, Gino Carmine S .

442. JACOME, John R .

443. JADULCO, Francis A .

444. JALIT, Ruby Ann S .

445. JARAMILLA, Dennis L .

446. JAVELOZA, Eric B .

447. JAVIER, Filemon Ray L .

448. JAVIER, Geraldine F .

449. JAVIER, III, Francisco P .

450. JIMENEZ, Ma. Cecilia B .

451. JIMENEZ, Minerva A .

452. JIMENEZ-SERRANO, Ethylene Grace A .

453. JO, Arvin A .

454. JOAQUIN, Dyanne O .

455. JOBOCO, Christian Alexander A .

456. JOCOM, Allister Michael C .

457. JOSE, Frederick August I .

458. JOSE, Raphael Augusto I .

459. JUMAMIL, Gerard Joseph M .

460. JUPLO, Ember Jann M .

461. KASILAG, Andrei Josef Y .

462. KOTAKE, Hiroshi R .

463. LA CHICA, Justin Vincent J .

464. LABAGUIS, Alden Patrick C .

465. LABANDRIA, Julius D .

466. LABOR, Sheeherazadee A .

467. LABUGUEN, Eric O .

468. LABUGUEN, Rhyss William G .

469. LACAMBACAL, Maria Icel L .

470. LACANDAZO, Jamahlin D .

471. LADERA, Jairo M .

472. LAGAN, Ana Pia Amor M .

473. LAIDAN, Karym B .

474. LANDAYAN, Paula Danica B .

475. LANDICHO, Alvin B .

476. LAPE, Janice S .

477. LARAÑO, Melbian Jerome E .

478. LASMARIAS, Peter Elfred A .

479. LASTIMOSO, Fritz A .

480. LAURENTE, Ann Camille A .

481. LAUZON, Mario Ryan E .

482. LAVISTA, Honoriza Krystle M .

483. LAYGO, JR., Hospicio I .

484. LAYUS, Cecilia Maeve T .

485. LAZARO, Jose Miguel N .

486. LAZARO, Vladi Miguel S .

487. LEDESMA, Mariness L .

488. LEE, Bryan Vince M .

489. LEE, Gene Nicholas A .

490. LEGASPI, Warren-derick T .

491. LEJANO, Charles Albert R .

492. LEQUIN, Lloyd M .

493. LIBANG, Gabriela Andrea R .

494. LIBATIQUE, III, Reynaldo C .

495. LIBUNAO, Dennis G .

496. LIDUA, Randall F .

497. LIGUTAN, Leo J .

498. LIM, Alexander F .

499. LIM, Camille Alison D .

500. LIM, Dyan Danika G .

501. LIM, Emma Malou U .

502. LIM, Esther Claudine F .

503. LIM, Ruth Katherine K .

504. LIMBO, Leonardo Oliver F .

505. LIMPANGOG, Junella G .

506. LIMPASAN, Fahkriemar H .

507. LINAG, Christopher S .

508. LIPAR, Mark Anthony H .

509. LLESOL, Rey T .

510. LLIDO, Jc Ma. Rose B .

511. LLOREN, Julie G .

512. LLUZ, Hobert N .

513. LOABLE, Nestor A .

514. LOINAZ, Maria Del Carmen Beatriz L .

515. LOPEZ, Jake J .

516. LOPEZ, Lew Carlo C .

517. LORENZO, Christine F .

518. LOTERTE, Vitto Duart C .

519. LU, Jocelyn B .

520. LU, Kristi Fe Mari E .

521. LUCAS, Margie Joy F .

522. LUMANLAN, Jennifer R .

523. MACALALAD, Alpheus D .

524. MACALINO, Joel U .

525. MACASAET, JR., Virgilio I .

526. MACASERO, Richyl Marie A .

527. MADAMBA-MALAPITAN, Roxan D .

528. MADREDIJO, Aemilda B .

529. MADRIAGA, Jesus Malcolm G .

530. MADRIAGA, Ma. Charizma B .

531. MADRIAGA, III, Frederick Faustino A .

532. MADRID, Nicolina C .

533. MAGALE, Suerlan T .

534. MAGALGALIT, Noel B .

535. MAGALLANES, Jonathan P .

536. MAGALLANES, Mark Anthony Lester N .

537. MAGBIRAY-PE, Monica S .

538. MAGSINO-SILOTERIO, Maria Elizabeth G .

539. MAGTANAO-TAGUINOD, Minerva R .

540. MAGTURO, Gale Auzen M .

541. MAGUIWET-FAUSTINO, Grace P .

542. MAJAROCON, Mandy R .

543. MAKALINGGAN-GLORIA, Gemma E .

544. MAKILING, Raymond S .

545. MALADAGA, Arabella L .

546. MALANYAON, Vera Q .

547. MALASIG, Alvin C .

548. MALIHAN, Marjorie B .

549. MALIWAT, Anselma P .

550. MALIWAT, Dax P .

551. MALLARI, Ianne Joy R .

552. MAMAD, Norsary S .

553. MANA-AY, Gary Angel S .

554. MANALOTO, Grace A .

555. MANGALINDAN-ESCALA, Olive M .

556. MANGASAR, Lora L .

557. MANGROBANG, III, Jonas Cesar C .

558. MANGUBAT, Brenda D .

559. MANGUIAT, Maria Pia Caterina M .

560. MANLANGIT, Nikko Rey Aicetel T .

561. MANONGSONG, Marie Joyce P .

562. MARASIGAN, Cyril G .

563. MARCELO, Dave Francis G .

564. MARIANO, Maria Antoniette V .

565. MARTELINO, Dino B .

566. MARTIN, JR., Edward Cesar C .

567. MARTINEZ, Judith R .

568. MARTINEZ, Marinelli T .

569. MASANGCAY, Jay G .

570. MATEO, Arnel D .

571. MAURO, Adryan S .

572. MEDALLA, Meiline C .

573. MEDINA, Gerald Y .

574. MEDINA, Narcisa T .

575. MEJIA, Vina Grace B .

576. MENDIOLA, Peter Leo G .

577. MENDITA, Francis Roy F .

578. MENDOZA, Bernice C .

579. MENDOZA, Charlene Clara G .

580. MENDOZA, Jocelyn Q .

581. MENDOZA, Jowell A .

582. MENDOZA, Zeus Gamaliel S .

583. MENESES, Christian Gil P .

584. MERCADO, Maria Tara A .

585. MERCANO, Steve Paolo A .

586. MERIOLES, Paul Michael G .

587. MESA, Maria Monette F .

588. MIANE, Jojane D .

589. MIGRIÑO, Charlene Mae S .

590. MILITANTE, III, Reynaldo Gregorio T .

591. MIRALLES, Marvin M .

592. MISCALA, Melvin A .

593. MIÑOZA, Mary Hazel B .

594. MOLERA, Sheryl Anne S .

595. MONARES, Unalee R .

596. MONGE, Vanessa Joyce I .

597. MONTALBO, Jeremy P .

598. MONTEMAYOR, JR., Jose C .

599. MONTEROLA, Janice P .

600. MONTES, Lemuel R .

601. MORALES, Mitzele Veron L .

602. MORALES, JR., Jesus Emmanuel O .

603. MUNZING, Susan A .

604. MUSICO, Keith Andrew G .

605. MUSONG, Richard Joseph R .

606. NABUNAT, JR., Maurice C .

607. NACAR, Jansen T .

608. NACILLA, Elvin Kein M .

609. NAJERA, JR., Jose A .

610. NAPAY-LITUSQUEN, Jean S .

611. NAVARRO, Michael Jourdan J .

612. NEPOMUCENO, Jonathan Francis C .

613. NG, Edison L .

614. NG, Jacob T .

615. NICDAO, Katrina Myra M .

616. NICOL, Ma. Donna Marcy B .

617. NOCOM, Hans Chester T .

618. NONATO, Regina Ann L .

619. NUDO, John Joenelle V .

620. NUESTRO, Juan Carlos P .

621. OBERIO, Charmagne Joie T .

622. OBLIGAR, Norhan C .

623. OCAMPO, Darwin S .

624. OCCIANO, Salvador Justino E .

625. ODI, Athenie Laarni S .

626. OI, Michico Rizza G .

627. OLA, Winnie Fred C .

628. OLARTE, Theodeus M .

629. OLAVERE, Erwin N .

630. OLBES, Renato P .

631. OMAR, Sorayda M .

632. OMELIO, JR., George C .

633. ONDA, Amie Rose L .

634. ONDI, Rey Mar G .

635. ONG, Ferlyn C .

636. OPERIANO, Aimee Joy B .

637. ORBE, Joanna Lyn P .

638. ORDOÑEZ, Levy P .

639. ORIG, Esperanza Caridad A .

640. ORPILLA, Julius G .

641. ORTEGA, Pinky D .

642. ORTIGUERRA, Marcel M .

643. ORTIZ, Martin Iñigo C .

644. ORTIZ, Rotela Fatima A .

645. ORTUA, Maria Christina C .

646. PACO, Michelle U .

647. PACURIBOT, Ban Mikhael C .

648. PADATE, Danieza Julaidah J .

649. PADATE, Wallad Abdani J .

650. PADILLA, Maria Vinina Bonita A .

651. PADLAN, Darwin Troy J .

652. PADLAN, Jay Vincent S .

653. PADRE, JR., Edgardo T .

654. PAGDANGANAN, Joeffrey G .

655. PAJARON, Jose Marie N .

656. PAJE, Scarlet Joy C .

657. PALAYON, Jethro M .

658. PALER, Paula Shena P .

659. PAMMIT, Oliver Gem C .

660. PANAHON, Emmar Benjoe B .

661. PANALIGAN, Marjorie B .

662. PANCHO, Jose Carlo C .

663. PANELO, JR., Salvador Paolo A .

664. PANLILIO, Carmina Marie R .

665. PANTI, Dante W .

666. PAPANDAYAN, Omar Camal G .

667. PARADA, Williamore P .

668. PARCIA, Charls Mark B .

669. PARIDO, Ma. Pelisa Corazon S .

670. PASIONA, Brix A .

671. PAYOT, Junefe G .

672. PAÑO, Diana Abigail A .

673. PELLAZAR, Brian B .

674. PENDINATAR, Aisa L .

675. PERALTA, Jeffrey P .

676. PERALTA, Siena Karen DG.

677. PEREZ, Ryan Romeo P .

678. PEREZ, Tara Tsarina B .

679. PEÑA, Rita Carla Fernandina O .

680. PEÑAFLORIDA, Kay Angela R .

681. PICCIO, Kathleen Joy C .

682. PICHAY, III, Benedict R .

683. PINEDA, Jesse Kenneth B .

684. PIZARRO, Abigail Camille A .

685. PLETE, Marianne P .

686. PO, Christine Glaisa S .

687. POBLACION, Krizelle Marie F .

688. POBLACION, Samantha L .

689. PULA, Sahlee T .

690. PULAYAN, Sherwin Peter O .

691. PUNO, Reginald Anton J .

692. PUNO, Theresa Marie C .

693. PUNZALAN, Kristine F .

694. PURUGGANAN, Kristin-zia B .

695. QUAZON, Paolo Justino T .

696. QUEJANO, Paolo Dominique O .

697. QUERRER, Anna Marie T .

698. QUILANG, Jennica M .

699. QUILOÑA, Zoraida P .

700. QUINAY, Pamela Elaine B .

701. QUINTO, Emma F .

702. QUINTO, Fitz Gerald G .

703. QUINTOS, Jay Antonell M .

704. QUIOC, Noven Joseph P .

705. QUISMORIO, Leo Angelo A .

706. RABE, Merryl Ann Hermila M .

707. RABON, Janine A .

708. RAFALES, Wilfredo B .

709. RAMA, Globel N .

710. RAMA, Mikel F .

711. RAMA, Tara Triztina C .

712. RAMEL, Ava Mari F .

713. RAMENTO, IV, Serafin L .

714. RAMOS, Archibald S .

715. RAMOS, George Ramil C .

716. RAMOS, Ma. Josephine M .

717. RAMOS, Ronald Allan D .

718. RANARA, Ruth D .

719. RANCES, III, Renato Ramon B .

720. RAÑESES, Ben John B .

721. REGAL, Miguel Antonio S .

722. REGOSO, Janice C .

723. REGUETA, Shyr Phoebe F .

724. REGUNTON, Katrina Gladys G .

725. REMEDIO, Irish Dwight L .

726. RETUYA, Niño Rey B .

727. REVIL, Jo Kristine C .

728. REYES, Alessandra Maria Anna Gloria O .

729. REYES, Alex Miguel P .

730. REYES, Catherine S .

731. REYES, Felix Conrad B .

732. REYES, Gerald James B .

733. REYES, Jan Manuelle

734. REYES, John Dominee A .

735. REYES, John Erwin A .

736. REYES, Lili-mae T .

737. REYES, Margaret Joyce M .

738. REYES, Mark Wilfred M .

739. REYES, Norly P .

740. REYES, III, Felipe Joaquin A .

741. REYES, JR., Isidro Martin F .

742. REYNALDO, Suzette R .

743. RICALDE, Rowena R .

744. RIEZA, Danielle Marie S .

745. RIMANDO, Clarence B .

746. RIVERA, Yvonne Marie A .

747. RIVERO, III, Roberto A .

748. RIÑOS, Shiela A .

749. ROCAFORT, Regulus R .

750. RODRIGUEZ, Christian Patrick S .

751. RODRIGUEZ, Francis Jerome V .

752. RODRIGUEZ, Josefina S .

753. RODRIGUEZ, Paolo Manuel T .

754. RODULFO, Vivien Leigh S .

755. ROMERO, Rafael Al D .

756. ROMULO, Mikhail G .

757. RONCALES, Gretchelyn G .

758. ROQUE, II, Rosalio D .

759. ROSALES, Robert H .

760. ROSARIO, Jearemmy S .

761. ROSARIO, Resida Rose T .

762. ROSAUPAN, Daniel T .

763. ROUX, Alma Jean Ganayo L .

764. ROXAS, Liberty D .

765. ROXAS, JR., Alan Maximilian Y .

766. RUBLICO, Roberto S .

767. RUFIN-CAIRO, Maricel C .

768. RULE, Eileen D .

769. RUPERTO, Ramon Antonio A .

770. SABIO, Jose Conrado Barker C .

771. SACO, Ronaldo B .

772. SACPA, Allan C .

773. SALANDANAN, Irish Krystle S .

774. SALAVANTE, Joanne P .

775. SALAZAR, Francisco Domingo Pascua L .

776. SALCEDO, Leandro B .

777. SALENDAB, Badr E .

778. SALGADO, Sabrina Gretchen D .

779. SALILIN, Arnan Amor P .

780. SALINAS, Stephen Ivan M .

781. SALIPSIP, Darren L .

782. SALISE, Rhys Hywel N .

783. SALOM, Kristoffer Bryan L .

784. SALONGA, Regina S .

785. SALUNAT, Blossom Joy V .

786. SALVADOR, Ralph Jerome D .

787. SALVAHAN, Jon Paulo V .

788. SALVOSA, Paolo R .

789. SAM, Rizza Mae H .

790. SAMBAJON, John Zernan T .

791. SAMONTE, Gerald Joseph H .

792. SAMONTE, John Paul T .

793. SAMPANA, JR., Alfonso G .

794. SAMSON, Ramon Miguel C .

795. SAN BUENAVENTURA, Maidy S .

796. SAN JUAN, Bryan A .

797. SAN JUAN, Sara Jei L .

798. SAN LUIS, Sophia Monica V .

799. SANTIAGO, Edlyn Margaret C .

800. SANTIAGO, Ryan Erik C .

801. SANTIAGO, Vesmind T .

802. SANTIAGO, JR., Roberto T .

803. SANTOS, Daryll Matthew T .

804. SANTOS, Sandra Jill S .

805. SANTOS, II, Honorio R .

806. SANTOS, JR., Emelito O .

807. SANTOS, JR., Roberto K .

808. SARANGAYA, Mary Joyce M .

809. SARAUM, Michelle Kristine D .

810. SARAUSOS, Janine J .

811. SAREMI, Kurush R .

812. SARENAS, Francesca Lois V .

813. SARIA, Eva Christine I .

814. SARITA, Jacky T .

815. SARMIENTO, Glaiza G .

816. SARMIENTO, Patrick P .

817. SARMIENTO, JR., Conrado R .

818. SARSABA, Ayn U .

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820. SASUMAN, Carl Vincent D .

821. SAVELLANO, Charmaine Joy R .

822. SEACHON, Art Ryan L .

823. SEBIDO, John Paul L .

824. SEGUIT, John Ryan E .

825. SEIJO, Edward Jason P .

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827. SERRANO, Czarina Grace A .

828. SEÑGA, Francesca Lourdes M .

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830. SHONTOGAN, Genevieve M .

831. SICAT, Melissa Ann B .

832. SICO, Michael Angelo G .

833. SIMBULAN, Reuben Antonio A .

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835. SINGZON, JR., Cesareo Antonio S .

836. SINON, Elvamay M .

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838. SISON, Ryan Donviv C .

839. SISON, III, Maximo Paulino T .

840. SO, Ralph David D .

841. SOLANO, Marc Gregory M .

842. SOLIVA, Peter Paul A .

843. SONGUITAN, Olive Ruth A .

844. SORIA, Ma. Maharani Liwaya P .

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846. SORIANO, Karl William Louise L .

847. SORIANO, Paolo T .

848. STA. ANA, Erwin D .

849. STA. MARIA, Karen Kaye M .

850. SUAN, Lordan G .

851. SULLA, Ronald Jose C .

852. SUMCAD, Antoniette K .

853. SUMONGCAD, Elsie B .

854. SUNGA, Johana T .

855. SUPERIO, Leoncio H .

856. SUSTENTO, Rex S .

857. SY, Candice Niña Marie O .

858. SY, Marianne Camille C .

859. SZE, Louie Brian R .

860. TABIRARA, Glacy S .

861. TABOTABO, Bianca Chloe S .

862. TADENA, II, Reuben A .

863. TADEO, Domer B .

864. TAGALAG, Bernadette V .

865. TAGUDIN, JR., Joseph T .

866. TAGUINOD, Carol B .

867. TALIPING, JR., Rogelio R .

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870. TAMONDONG, Blessalyn M .

871. TAN, Candy N .

872. TAN, Elaine G .

873. TAN, Jean Cathleen Y .

874. TAN, Luis Martin V .

875. TAN, Manuel Anthony S .

876. TAN, Rolan L .

877. TANCHICO, Reizel Ann A .

878. TANYAG, Lauren Rose R .

879. TAVERNER, Marianne S .

880. TAWAY, IV, Gil G .

881. TE, Wryan Martin C .

882. TECSON, Ma. Christina E .

883. TEJIDA, III, Guillermo C .

884. TEMPLADO, Ruby R .

885. TEMPROSA, Francis Tom F .

886. TENORIO, JR., Orlando F .

887. TETANGCO, Anna Teresa G .

888. TEVES, Patrick Ryan G .

889. TIANSAY, Kristoffer L .

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891. TIU, Kenneth R .

892. TIUSECO, Manolito T .

893. TOBIANO, Irish L .

894. TOBOSO, Stephen Jacon M .

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896. TOLENTINO, Aaron S .

897. TOLENTINO, Florence O .

898. TOLENTINO, Paolo Carlo C .

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900. TORRECAMPO, Charlene M .

901. TORREJA, Richard P .

902. TORRES, Christopher John A .

903. TORRES, Jesus G .

904. TORREVILLAS, Manuelindo Josef A .

905. TOYOKAN, JR., Simon K .

906. TRESVALLES, Tristan Frederick L .

907. TRIA, Grace Sarah S .

908. TROJILLO, Ernelson Q .

909. TUAZON, Shirley C .

910. TUBLAN, Benzon C .

911. TUGADE, Jose Arturo M .

912. TUGDAY, Carmi Czarina V .

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920. UMALI, Al Matthew P .

921. UMALI, Mildred Yovela S .

922. UNO, Mark Cyrus C .

923. UY, Edwin Alden V .

924. UY, Joan Marie W .

925. UY, Jonathan Paul T .

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929. UY, Ryan M .

930. VALDERRAMA, Maricef F .

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932. VALENCIA, Dianeth L .

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937. VEGA, Joseph S .

938. VEHEMENTE, Paul R .

939. VELASQUEZ, Mae Kirsten R .

940. VELO, Eileen T .

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944. VERGARA, Don Immanuel V .

945. VIBAL, Reynante B .

946. VILCHES-MEDINA, Imee G .

947. VILLAGRACIA, Jayvee E .

948. VILLALUZ, Alpheus T .

949. VILLAMAYOR, III, Don Briccio F .

950. VILLANUEVA, Don D .

951. VILLANUEVA, Gabriel S .

952. VILLANUEVA, Jerusha O .

953. VILLANUEVA, Kip Francis P .

954. VILLANUEVA, Teresa S .

955. VILLARIN, Erwin Glenn Q .

956. VILLAVERT, Francez Vanessa N .

957. VILLEGAS, Jan Freeman C .

958. VILORIA, Jumar A .

959. VILORIA, JR., Gil P .

960. VINIEGRA, Carmeline Q .

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963. VIZCARRA, JR., Jose M .

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965. YAMBAO, Carmela C .

966. YAMBOT, Maria Cristina P .

967. YANGO, Rafael G .

968. YAP, Philip Hussien B .

969. YAP, Warren Jeffrey B .

970. YEE, Zeus Izzy T .

971. YLANAN, Medrobel P .

972. YONG-GABON, Ma. Daryl Q .

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974. YU, Charlene Anne G .

975. YU, Cherlynne G .

976. YU, Gerald R .

977. YUSON, Giancarlo L .

978. ZAMORA, Fatima Anne C .

979. ZUBELDIA, Joel B .

980. ZULUETA, Maryrose J .

981. ZULUETA, JR., Leonardo C .

982. ZUÑIGA, Patricia Lauren D .