Nestle's "Coffee-Mate" vs. Puregold's "Coffee Match"

In a Decision dated September 6, 2017 in the case of SOCIETE DES PRODUITS, NESTLE, S.A. vs. PUREGOLD PRICE CLUB, G.R. No. 217194, the Supreme Court Ruled in favor of Puregold:

     The word "COFFEE" is the common dominant feature between Nestle's mark "COFFEE-MATE" and Puregold's mark "COFFEE MATCH." However, following Section 123, paragraph (h) of RA 8293 which prohibits exclusive registration of generic marks, the word "COFFEE" cannot be exclusively appropriated by either Nestle or Puregold since it is generic or descriptive of the goods they seek to identify. In Asia Brewery, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,55 this Court held that generic or descriptive words are not subject to registration and belong to the public domain. Consequently, we must look at the word or words paired with the generic or descriptive word, in this particular case "-MATE" for Nestle's mark and "MATCH" for Puregold's mark, to determine the distinctiveness and registrability of Puregold's mark "COFFEE MATCH." 

     We agree with the findings of the BLA-IPO and ODG-IPO. The distinctive features of both marks are sufficient to warn the purchasing public which are Nestle's products and which are Puregold's products. While both "-MATE" and "MATCH" contain the same first three letters, the last two letters in Puregold's mark, "C" and "H," rendered a visual and aural character that made it easily distinguishable from Nestle's mark. Also, the distinctiveness of Puregold's mark with two separate words with capital letters "C" and "M" made it distinguishable from Nestle's mark which is one word with a hyphenated small letter "-m" in its mark. In addition, there is a phonetic difference in pronunciation between Nestle's "-MATE" and Puregold's "MATCH." As a result, the eyes and ears of the consumer would not mistake Nestle's product for Puregold's product. Accordingly, this Court sustains the findings of the BLA-IPO and ODG-IPO that the likelihood of confusion between Nestle's product and Puregold's product does not exist and upholds the registration of Puregold's mark.

CASE DIGEST: Sambar vs. Levi Strauss

VENANCIO SAMBAR, doing business under the name and style of CVS Garment Enterprises vs. LEVI STRAUSS & CO., LEVI STRAUSS (PHIL.), INC.

FACTS:

Private respondents alleged in their complaint that Levi Strauss and Co. (LS&Co.), an internationally known clothing manufacturer, own the arcuate design trademark which was registered under US Trademark Registration No. 404,248 on November 16, 1943. That sometime in 1987, CVSGIC and Venancio Sambar, without the consent and authority of private respondents and in infringement and unfair competition, sold and advertised, and despite demands to cease and desist, continued to manufacture, sell and advertise denim, pants under the brand name “Europress” with back pockets bearing a design similar to the arcuate trademark of private respondents, thereby causing confusion on the buying public, prejudiced to private respondent’s goodwill and property right.

Sambar filed a separate answer. He admitted that copyright Registration No. 1-1998 was issued to him, but he denied using it. He said he did not authorize anyone to use the copyrighted design.

Trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining CVSGIC and petitioner from manufacturing, advertising and selling pants with the arcuate design on their back pockets.

Private respondents moved for reconsideration praying for the cancellation of petitioner’s copyright registration.

Trial court granted the prayer.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner infringe on private respondent’s arcuate design.

HELD:

To be entitled to a copyright, the thing being copyrighted must be original, created by the author through his own skill, labor and judgment, without directly copying or evasively imitating the work of another.

Both the trail court and the Court of Appeals found there was infringement.

CASE DIGEST: Philippine Nut Industry vs. Standards Brands

PHILIPPINE NUT INDUSTRY, INC. vs. STANDARD BRANDS INCORPORATED and TIBURCIO S. EVALLE as Director of Patents

G.R. No. L-23035 July 31, 1975

Facts:

Philippine Nut Industry Inc., a domestic corporation, obtained from the Patent Office on August 10, 1961, a certificate covering the trademark "PHILIPPINE PLANTERS CORDIAL PEANUTS," the label used on its product of salted peanuts.

On May 14, 1962, Standard Brands, a foreign corporation, filed a case with the Director of Patent, asking for the cancellation of Philippine Nut's certificate of registration on the ground that "the registrant was not entitled to register the mark at the time of its application for registration thereof" for the reason that it (Standard Brands) is the owner of the trademark "PLANTERS COCKTAIL PEANUTS" covered by Certificate of Registration No. SR-172, issued by the Patent Office on July 28, 1958.

Thereafter, the Philippine Nut filed its answer invoking the special defense that its registered label is not confusingly similar to that of Standard Brands as the latter alleges.

Respondent Director of Patents gave due course to Standard Brand's petition, ordering the cancellation of Philippine Nut's Certificate of Registration.

Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, the Philippine Nut petitioned for a review, seeking the reversal of the Director of Patents’ decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the trademark "PHILIPPINE PLANTERS CORDIAL PEANUTS" used by Philippine Nut on its label for salted peanuts with the same coloring scheme and the same lay-out of words, confusingly similar to the trademark "PLANTERS COCKTAIL PEANUTS" used by Standard Brands on its product.

Ruling:

Yes. As to appearance and general impression of the two trademarks, the Supreme Court said it found a very confusing similarity.

The word PLANTERS printed across the upper portion of the label in bold letters easily attracts and catches the eye of the ordinary consumer and it is that word and none other that sticks in his mind when he thinks of salted peanuts.

The Supreme Court also held that although it is true that no producer or manufacturer may have a monopoly of any color scheme or form of words in a label, but when a competitor adopts a distinctive or dominant mark or feature of another's trademark and with it makes use of the same color ensemble, employs similar words written in a style, type and size of lettering almost identical with those found in the other trademark, the intent to pass to the public his product as that of the other is quite obvious. It deceives the public.

Hence, the decision of respondent Director of Patents was affirmed.

CASE DIGEST: Mighty vs. La Campana Fabrica

MIGHTY CORPORATION and LA CAMPANA FABRICA DE TABACO, INC. vs. E.J. GALLO WINERY and THE ANDRESONS GROUP, INC.

FACTS:

            On March 12, 1993, respondents sued petitioners in the RTC-Makati for trademark and trade name infringement and unfair competition, with a prayer for damages and preliminary injunction.

            They claimed that petitioners adopted the Gallo trademark to ride on Gallo Winery’s and Gallo and Ernest & Julio Gallo trademark’s established reputation and popularity, thus causing confusion, deception and mistake on the part of the purchasing public who had always associated Gallo and Ernest and Julio & Gallo trademarks with Gallo Winery’s wines.

            In their answer, petitioners alleged, among other affirmative defenses that: petitioners Gallo cigarettes and Gallo Winery’s wine were totally unrelated products. To wit:

1.    Gallo Winery’s GALLO trademark registration certificates covered wines only, and not cigarettes;

2.    GALLO cigarettes and GALLO wines were sold through different channels of trade;

3.    the target  market of Gallo Winery’s wines was the middle or high-income bracket while Gallo cigarette buyers were farmers, fishermen, laborers and other low-income workers;

4.    the dominant feature of the Gallo cigarette was the rooster device with the manufacturer’s name clearly indicated as MIGHTY CORPORATION, while in the case of Gallo Winery’s wines, it was the full names of the founders-owners ERNEST & JULIO GALLO or just their surname GALLO;

On April 21, 1993, the Makati RTC denied, for lack of merit, respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

On August 19, 1993, respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

On February 20, 1995, the CA likewise dismissed respondent’s petition for review on certiorari.

After the trial on the merits, however, the Makati RTC, on November 26, 1998, held petitioners liable for, permanently enjoined from committing trademark infringement and unfair competition with respect to the GALLO trademark.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the Makati RTC’s decision and subsequently denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether GALLO cigarettes and GALLO wines were identical, similar or related goods for the reason alone that they were purportedly forms of vice.

HELD:

           

            Wines and cigarettes are not identical, similar, competing or related goods.

            In resolving whether goods are related, several factors come into play:

·         the business (and its location) to which the goods belong

·         the class of product to which the good belong

·    the product’s quality, quantity, or size, including the nature of the package, wrapper or container

·         the nature and cost of the articles

·   the descriptive properties, physical attributes or essential characteristics with reference to their form, composition, texture or quality

·         the purpose of the goods

·   whether the article is bought for immediate consumption, that is, day-to-day household items

·         the field of manufacture

·         the conditions under which the article is usually purchased and

·      the articles of the trade through which the goods flow, how they are distributed, marketed, displayed and sold.

The test of fraudulent simulation is to the likelihood of the deception of some persons in some measure acquainted with an established design and desirous of purchasing the commodity with which that design has been associated. The simulation, in order to be objectionable, must be as appears likely to mislead the ordinary intelligent buyer who has a need to supply and is familiar with the article that he seeks to purchase.

The petitioners are not liable for trademark infringement, unfair competition or damages.

WHEREFORE, petition is granted.

CASE DIGEST: Etepha A.G. vs. Director of Patents

16 SCRA 495 (1966)

FACTS:

            On April 23, 1959, private respondent  Westmont Pharmaceuticals, Inc. sought registration of trademark “Atussin” This was objected to by petitioner Etepha, A.G. alleging that it will be detrimental on their part as it is confusingly similar to its Pertussin. Both products deal with the treatment of cough.

ISSUE:

            Whether or not Attusin may be registered as a trademark.

HELD:

            Yes. x x x The validity of a cause for infringment is predicated upon colorable imitation. The phrase “colorable imitaion” denotes such a “close or ingenious imitation as to be calculated to deceive ordinary persons, or such a resemblance to the original as to deceive an ordinary purchaser giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, and to cause him to purchase the one supposing it to be the other.”

            While “tussin” by itself cannot thus be used exclusively to identify one’s goods, it may properly become the subject of a trademark “by combination with another word or phrase.”

            The two labels are entirely different in colors, contents, arrangement of words theeon, sizes, shapes and general appearance. The contrasts in pictorial effects and appeals to the eye is so pronounced that the label of one cannot be mistaken for that of the other, not even by persons unfamiliar with the two trademarks.

            We cannot escape notice of the fact that the two words do not sound alike – when pronounced.