Monday, March 21, 2011

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Marikina Auto Line transport Corp. vs. People

MARIKINA AUTO LINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION and FREDDIE L. SUELTO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ERLINDA V. VALDELLON
[G.R. No. 152040 March 31, 2006]

FACTS:
Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment located at No. 31 Kamias Road, Quezon City. The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the owner-operator of a passenger bus with Plate Number NCV-849. Suelto, its employee, was assigned as the regular driver of the bus.

At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was driving the aforementioned passenger bus along Kamias Road, Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). The bus suddenly swerved to the right and struck the terrace of the commercial apartment owned by Valdellon located along Kamuning Road. Valdellon demanded payment of P148,440.00 to cover the cost of the damage to the terrace. The bus company and Suelto offered a P30,000.00 settlement which Valdellon refused.

Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property against Suelto. Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint against Suelto and the bus company for damages. Suelto maintained that, in an emergency case, he was not, in law, negligent. Both the trial court and the CA ruled in against herein petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sudden emergency rule applies in the case at bar.

HELD:
No.

x x x

It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner Suelto’s defense that he acted on an emergency, that is, he had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid colliding with a passenger jeep coming from EDSA that had overtaken another vehicle and intruded into the lane of the bus. The sudden emergency rule was enunciated by this Court in Gan v. Court of Appeals,23 thus:

[O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.

Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, motorists are mandated to drive and operate vehicles on the right side of the road or highway:

SEC. 37. Driving on right side of highway. – Unless a different course of action is required in the interest of the safety and the security of life, person or property, or because of unreasonable difficulty of operation in compliance herewith, every person operating a motor vehicle or an animal-drawn vehicle on a highway shall pass to the right when meeting persons or vehicles coming toward him, and to the left when overtaking persons or vehicles going the same direction, and when turning to the left in going from one highway to another, every vehicle shall be conducted to the right of the center of the intersection of the highway.

Section 35 of the law provides, thus:

Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed.—(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.

In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code provides that "unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent, if at the time of mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation." By his own admission, petitioner Suelto violated the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when he suddenly swerved the bus to the right, thereby causing damage to the property of private respondent.

However, the trial court correctly rejected petitioner Suelto’s defense, in light of his contradictory testimony vis-à-vis his Counter-Affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation:

It is clear from the photographs submitted by the prosecution (Exhs. C, D, G, H & I) that the commercial apartment of Dr. Valdellon sustained heavy damage caused by the bus being driven by Suelto. "It seems highly improbable that the said damages were not caused by a strong impact. And, it is quite reasonable to conclude that, at the time of the impact, the bus was traveling at a high speed when Suelto tried to avoid the passenger jeepney." Such a conclusion finds support in the decision of the Supreme Court in People vs. Ison, 173 SCRA 118, where the Court stated that "physical evidence is of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses." The pictures submitted do not lie, having been taken immediately after the incident. The damages could not have been caused except by a speeding bus. Had the accused not been speeding, he could have easily reduced his speed and come to a full stop when he noticed the jeep. Were he more prudent in driving, he could have avoided the incident or even if he could not avoid the incident, the damages would have been less severe.

In addition to this, the accused has made conflicting statements in his counter-affidavit and his testimony in court. In the former, he stated that the reason why he swerved to the right was because he wanted to avoid the passenger jeepney in front of him that made a sudden stop. But, in his testimony in court, he said that it was to avoid a passenger jeepney coming from EDSA that was overtaking by occupying his lane. Such glaring inconsistencies on material points render the testimony of the witness doubtful and shatter his credibility. Furthermore, the variance between testimony and prior statements renders the witness unreliable. Such inconsistency results in the loss in the credibility of the witness and his testimony as to his prudence and diligence.

As already maintained and concluded, the severe damages sustained could not have resulted had the accused acted as a reasonable and prudent man would. The accused was not diligent as he claims to be. What is more probable is that the accused had to swerve to the right and hit the commercial apartment of the plaintiff because he could not make a full stop as he was driving too fast in a usually crowded street.

Moreover, if the claim of petitioners were true, they should have filed a third-party complaint against the driver of the offending passenger jeepney and the owner/operator thereof.

Petitioner Suelto’s reliance on the sudden emergency rule to escape conviction for the crime charged and his civil liabilities based thereon is, thus, futile.


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